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GETTING THE FACTS: EMPIRICAL EVALUATION AND THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRE-ABORTION PARENTAL
NOTIFICATION STATUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
In Hodgson v. Minnesota I and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health,2 the Supreme Court upheld two state statutes requiring that,
before undergoing abortions, minors must notify their parents or pro-
ceed through judicial hearings.3 In Hodgson, the Court held unconstitu-
tional the portion of a statute requiring notification of both parents
without providing the minor with the option of a judicial hearing in lieu
of notifying both parents. 4 In addition to revealing fundamental dis-
agreements regarding the appropriate standard of review, the Court's
fragmented opinions in the two cases reveal sharp differences in the use
of social science evidence by the various Justices. Although differences
among the Justices with regard to the use of social science evidence have
surfaced before, these differences are particularly pronounced in Hodg-
son and Ohio v. Akron Center because of the large body of empirical data
that was presented to the Court as relevant to a resolution of the consti-
tutional issues.5 The Court's use of this data takes on added significance
given the volatile nature of the abortion debate6 and given recent chal-
lenges to legislative action in the abortion area.7
This Note examines the consideration given to empirical data in the
two cases. Section II reviews the prior decisions in which the Supreme
Court has addressed statutes mandating parental involvement in abor-
tion decisions by minors.8 Section III discusses the wide divergence in
reasoning that is apparent in the nine opinions filed in Hodgson and Ohio
v. Akron Center.9 That section focuses on the Justices' consideration of
1. 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
2. 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990).
3. MINN. STAT. § 144.343 (1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12 (Ander-
son 1987). For a discussion of the provisions of the Minnesota statute that were
upheld by the Court, see infra note 57 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the text of the Ohio statute, see infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of the provision of the Minnesota statute that was held
unconstitutional by the Court, see infra note 55 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of this data, see infra notes 117-18, 148-49 & 184 and
accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Phila. Inquirer, Aug. 25, 1991, at A4, col. 1 (anti-abortion pro-
tests in Wichita, Kansas have resulted in approximately 2,600 arrests).
7. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding part of Pennsylvania's abortion statute constitutional and part uncon-
stitutional), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3498 (1992).
8. See infra notes 18-54 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 55-269 and accompanying text.
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empirical data in determining the legitimacy of the state's purpose,10 the
burden of the statute l and the statute's ability to further the state's pur-
pose.1 2 Particularly evident is the contrast between Justice Marshall's
opinion in Hodgson, which relies on empirical data and an "as applied"
test of constitutionality,' 3 and Justice Kennedy's opinion in Hodgson,
which relies on precedent, the "page~s of human experience" and a "fa-
cial" test of constitutionality.' 4 Section IV suggests a method of consti-
tutional analysis that takes into account empirical reality and data from
the actual operation of state statutes.15 That section recommends more
precise analysis of the relative interests of the minor, her parents and
the state.16 Finally, section V advocates the use of research data to en-
sure more sensible and sensitive legislation and adjudication in the
abortion area.17
II. BACKGROUND
Prior to Hodgson and Ohio v. Akron Center, the Supreme Court had
examined the constitutionality of statutes requiring pre-abortion paren-
tal consent or parental notification in six cases.' 8 In these cases, the
Court developed a framework for balancing the interests of minors, 19
their parents and the state in the minors' decisions regarding
10. See infra notes 105-47 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 148-83 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 184-234 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion ofJustice Marshall's reasoning, see infra notes 150-52,
155-66 & 215-29 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of Justice Kennedy's reasoning, see infra notes 153,
167-69 & 230-34 and accompanying text. The "pages of human experience"
quotation is from a passage in Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979), that was
quoted by justice Kennedy in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2968-69
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
15. See infra notes 270-99 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 288-91 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 300-06 and accompanying text.
18. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983);
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416
(1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622(1979) (Bellotti I); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti 1); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). Also, the Court affirmed, without
opinion, a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
addressing an Illinois parental notification statute. See Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763
F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 484 U.S. 171 (1987). For a more complete
discussion of the development of the law in these cases, see Lindsey, The Viability
of Parental Abortion Notification and Consent Statutes: Assessing Fact and Fiction, 38 AM.
U.L. REV. 881, 888-97 (1989).
19. "Minor" is usually defined in the statutes as a woman under the age of
18. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12S. (West 1983). The ordinance
at issue in Akron v. Akron Center, however, had specific provisions relating to wo-
men under the age of 15. Akron v. Akron Center, 462 U.S. at 422 n.4 (quoting
AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870.05 (1978)).
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abortion.20
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,2 1 the Court's first decision in this
area, the Court acknowledged that a minor has a constitutional right to
privacy that prevents the state from placing an undue burden on her
access to an abortion.22 Thus, the state may not constitutionally grant
parents an absolute veto power over a minor's decision.23 The Court
also made it clear, however, that a minor's right could be limited in ways
that would be unconstitutional if applied to adults.24 A state statute reg-
ulating minors' abortion decisions need only further a "significant" state
interest rather than the more stringent "compelling" state interest re-
quired for a statute regulating the decisions of adults. 25 Because a state
interest of a lesser degree was sufficient to support it, a statute regulat-
ing the abortion decisions of minors was permitted to be more restric-
tive than a statute regulating the abortion decisions of adults.
In Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti i1),26 the Court again addressed the bal-
ance between the state's interest in mandated parental involvement and
the minor's constitutional right to seek an abortion. 27 There, a Massa-
chusetts statute was held unconstitutional because it allowed a judge to
overrule a minor's decision to abort even if she were found mature
enough to give informed consent to the procedure and because it re-
20. For a discussion of these interests, see infra notes 105-47 and accompa-
nying text.
21. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
22. Id. at 74 ("Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
rights."). In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court held that
the right to an abortion is founded on the right to privacy. Id. at 153.
23. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. The Missouri statute required unmarried mi-
nors to obtain the consent of a parent prior to an abortion. Id. at 72. The Court
found that this statute gave a minor's parent an absolute, and possibly arbitrary,
veto over her decision, a power the Court found constituted an unconstitutional
burden on the minor's right to seek an abortion. Id. at 74.
24. Id. at 74 ("The Court... long has recognized that the State has some-
what broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults.").
25. Id. at 75 (there is "significant state interest in conditioning an abortion
... that is not present in the case of an adult"). This relaxed standard "left the
door open to consideration of other statutory requirements for parental involve-
ment in minors' abortion decisions." Melton & Pliner, Adolescent Abortion: A
Psycholegal Analysis, in ADOLESCENT ABORTION 1, 5 (G. Melton ed. 1986). For a
discussion of the standard of review applicable to parental notification and con-
sent statutes, see infra notes 75-97 and accompanying text.
26. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
27. Id In an earlier decision, Bellotti I, 428 U.S. 132 (1976), the Court va-
cated a district court's declaration that a Massachusetts parental consent statute
was unconstitutional and ordered the district court to certify questions regard-
ing the meaning of the statute to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Id.
at 151-62. After the Massachusetts court answered these questions, the statute
was again declared unconstitutional in Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1006
(D. Mass. 1978), and the appeal became Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
1991] NOTE 1613
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quired all minors seeking abortions to first seek parental consent.2 8 Bel-
lotti II made it clear that by failing to allow minors to bypass parental
involvement in abortion decisions, Massachusetts had created an imper-
missible burden on their right to privacy.29 Thus, the Court concluded
that to meet constitutional requirements, a statute must provide for an
alternative proceeding, allowing the minor to obtain an abortion with-
out parental involvement.30 The plurality, against a vigorous protest,
provided a blueprint for a statute that would withstand a constitutional
challenge.3' The plurality stated that the statute must provide for an
alternative proceeding in which the minor may either demonstrate that
she is sufficiently mature to make a reasoned, informed decision, or that
an abortion is in her best interests. 32
The framework developed in Bellotti II has served as a guide for
both legislatures and courts.33 A number of states enacted parental no-
tification or consent statutes based on the guidelines provided by the
Bellotti H Court.34 The Court's decisions in City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health 3 5 and Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft 3 6
28. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 651. As construed by the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, the statute in Bellotti II required parental notice in virtually
every case where the parent was available. Id. at 631, 646. Also, the statute
permitted "a judge to veto the abortion decision of a minor found to be capable
of giving informed consent." Id. at 632.
29. Id. at 647. As noted earlier, the right to seek an abortion is grounded in
the right to privacy. See supra note 22.
30. Bellotti I, 443 U.S. at 647-48.
31. Id. at 643-44. The plurality opinion was authored by Justice Powell andjoined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist. Justice Ste-
vens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, declined to join the
plurality opinion because he felt that in laying out the blueprint of a statute that
would pass constitutional muster the Court was rendering an advisory opinion
when it should wait for an actual "case or controversy." Id. at 656 n.4. Justice
White dissented. Id. at 656.
32. Id. at 643-44.
33. Some commentators maintain that the Bellotti II framework has served
as a straitjacket. See Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protec-
tion of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 694-97 (Bellotti II framework
has been "constitutionalized" and courts have felt constrained to accept consti-
tutionality of statutes that appear to conform to dicta in that decision). For a
discussion of how the district court and appellate court in the Hodgson litigation
felt bound by Bellotti II, see infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
34. At least 16 states have enacted parental consent statutes that provide
the option of bypassing parents and seeking approval from a judge, and at least
eight states have enacted parental notice statutes with a judicial bypass option.
See 2 H. HOOD, I. KAvASS & C. GALVIN, ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A
COMPILATION OF STATE LEGISLATION 167-309 (1991).
A recent review found that 38 states had enacted laws requiring either pa-
rental consent or notice, with or without a judicial bypass option, of which 15
were enforced, 13 were enjoined and 10 were not enforced. Greenberger &
Connor, Parental Notice and Consent for Abortion: Out of Step with Family Law Princi-
ples and Policies, 23 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 31 (1991).
35. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
36. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
1614 [Vol. 36: p. 1611
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suliported the application of the Bellotti II framework to parental consent
statutes.3 7 In Akron v. Akron Center, the Court reviewed a local ordinance
that required all minors under the age of fifteen to obtain parental con-
sent prior to abortions.38 The ordinance was held unconstitutional be-
cause minors under the age of fifteen did not have an alternative means
to obtain a determination that they were mature or that an abortion
without parental approval was in their best interests.3 9 In Ashcroft, the
Court upheld a Missouri parental consent statute patterned after the
standards outlined in Bellotti JJ.40 The Missouri statute provided a preg-
nant minor who elected not to seek parental consent with an alternative
avenue (i.e., petition to the juvenile court) whereby she could demon-
strate that she was sufficiently mature to make the decision herself or,
alternatively, that despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her
best interests. 4 1
Thus, these four cases indicated that a state could require a minor
to obtain parental consent prior to an abortion only if the state provided
for an alternative procedure whereby the minor could obtain judicial au-
thorization of the abortion in lieu of parental consent.42 Judicial deci-
sionmaking in such alternative procedures was to be conditioned on a
determination of the minor's maturity, or if she was immature, her best
interests. 43
37. For a discussion of how these cases supported Belloiti II, see infra notes
38-41 and accompanying text.
38. Akron v. Akron Center, 462 U.S. at 422 n.4 (quoting AKRON, OHIO, CODI-
FIED ORDINANCES § 1870.05 (1978)). The ordinance prohibited a physician
from performing
an abortion upon a minor pregnant woman under the age of fifteen
(15) years without ... (1) First having obtained the informed written
consent of one of her parents or her legal guardian ... or (2) The
minor pregnant woman first having obtained an order from a court...
that the abortion be performed or induced.
Id The Court held that the provision for a court order was not sufficient to meet
the requirements of Bellotti II because it did not provide for a determination of
the minor's maturity. Id at 439-42.
39. Id. This decision explicitly supported the Bellotti II framework: "Ak-
ron's ordinance does not create expressly the alternative procedure required by
Bellotti II." Id. at 440.
40. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 494.
41. The Missouri statute provided that the court
shall for good cause: (a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the
purpose of consenting to the abortion; or (b) Find the abortion to be in
the best interests of the minor and give judicial consent to the abortion,
setting forth the grounds for so finding; or (c) Deny the petition, setting
forth the grounds on which the petition is denied.
Id. at 492. The Court's dicta in Bellotti I had suggested that a statute must pro-
vide for a bypass alternative in which it is determined whether the minor is ma-
ture enough to consent or if an abortion is in her best interests. Bellotti II, 443
U.S. at 643-44.
42. See Akron v. Akron Center, 462 U.S. 416; Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476. For a
discussion of Akron and Ashcroft, see supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
43. See Akron v. Akron Center, 462 U.S. 416; Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476.
1991] NOTE 1615
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Prior to Hodgson and Ohio v. Akron Center, however, there was still
some debate as to whether the same framework would be necessary to
preserve the constitutionality of parental notification statutes, as op-
posed to parental consent statutes.4 4 In 1981, in H.L. v. Matheson,45 the
Supreme Court held that a state may require parental notification with-
out providing an alternative when an immature, unemancipated, depen-
dent minor seeks an abortion, but the Court reserved judgment on
whether state interests would justify requiring notification of the parents
of a mature minor seeking an abortion. 46 The Supreme Court had an-
other opportunity to evaluate the constitutionality of a parental notifica-
tion statute in 1987. In that case, Zbaraz v. Hartigan,4 7 the Court
affirmed, without opinion, the Seventh Circuit's decision to uphold in
part and invalidate in part an Illinois parental notification statute.4 8 The
Seventh Circuit had upheld the provisions of the statute that conformed
to Bellotti II, suggesting that parental notification statutes must meet the
44. Justice Stevens said in concurrence in Bellotti II that neither that case
nor Danforth "determine[d] the constitutionality of a statute which does no more
than require notice to the parents." Belloti II, 443 U.S. at 654 n. 1 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment). He reiterated this view in H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S.
398, 421 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). However, in another
concurring opinion in Matheson, Justice Powell expressed the view that Bellotti II
also controlled parental notification statutes. See id. at 420 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). For a discussion of the debate over this issue, see Lindsey, supra note 18,
at 894 n.78.
45. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
46. Id. at 406. The statute required the physician to "[n]otify, if possible,
the parents or guardian of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be per-
formed, if she is a minor ...." Id. at 400. Appellant contended that the statute
was "overbroad in that it (could] be construed to apply to all unmarried minor
girls, including those who [were] mature and emancipated." Id. at 405. The
Court did not reach that question because the appellant "did not allege or prof-
fer any evidence that either she or any member of her class (was] mature or
emancipated." Id. at 406 (footnote omitted). Therefore, the Court only
addressed
the facial constitutionality of a statute requiring a physician to give no-
tice to parents if possible ... when: the girl is living with and depen-
dent on her parents, . . . she is not emancipated by marriage or
otherwise, and ... she has made no claim or showing as to her maturity
or as to her relation with her parents.
Id. at 407. The Court held that "[a]s applied to immature and dependent mi-
nors, the statute plainly serves... important considerations .... In addition, as
applied to the class, the statute serves a significant state interest by providing an
opportunity for parents to supply essential medical and other information to a
physician." Id. at 411. At another point, the Court stated that "[a]s applied to
that class properly before us, the statute plainly serves important state interests,
is narrowly drawn to protect only those interests and does not violate any guar-
antees of the Constitution." Id. at 413; cf. id. at 438-53 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
47. 108 U.S. 479 (1987), aff'g mer., 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985).
48. Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mern., 484 U.S.
171 (1987). The court of appeals held that the 24 hour waiting period imposed
by the statute was unconstitutional. Id.
1616 [Vol. 36: p. 1611
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Bellotti II criteria to the same extent as parental consent statutes. 49
Hodgson and Ohio v. Akron Center presented the Court with the oppor-
tunity to resolve the debate over whether a bypass mechanism is neces-
sary to preserve the constitutionality of a notification statute. More
importantly for this analysis, Hodgson provided the Court with the op-
portunity to consider accumulated data on the actual benefits and bur-
dens of statutes enacted to conform to the Bellotti II guidelines.50 The
earlier cases had not addressed the "as applied" or "in operation" con-
stitutionality of state statutes mandating parental involvement or requir-
ing waiting periods.5 1 Although some "research" literature had been
cited in prior cases, the Hodgson Court was presented with data that was
not available at the time those cases were decided.5 2 Ohio v. Akron Center
49. Id. Appellees "d[id] not contest the sufficiency of the procedures...
for making the determination that the minor is mature or that, if the court finds
that she is immature, an abortion is nonetheless in her best interests," but
rather, the dispute was whether "the procedures were unconstitutional because
they failed to ensure the expeditious and confidential disposition of the proceed-
ings required by Bellolti IL" Id. at 1539. The court of appeals enjoined enforce-
ment of the statute until the Illinois Supreme Court enacted "rules assuring the
expeditious and confidential disposition of the judicial hearings which allowed a
minor.., to forego ... notice." Id. at 1545.
50. At the trial level, extensive data was collected on the operation of the
Minnesota statute. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 762-70 (D. Minn.
1986). For a discussion of this data, see infra notes 117-18, 148-49 & 184 and
accompanying text.
51. The constitutionality of notice statutes "as applied" was specifically left
open by Justice Stevens in Bellotti II where he stated that, in actual application,
state regulations entailing parental consent or notification coupled with a judi-
cial bypass procedure may create undue and unforseen burdens on a minor that
the Court failed to anticipate. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring
in judgment).
One commentator has proposed distinguishing "as applied" challenges
from what she refers to as "operational challenges." Pine, supra note 33, at 703.
Pine has stated that a challenge like the one in Hodgson "is not an attack on the
law 'as applied' because plaintiffs sought across-the-board relief, not invalidation
of a particular application or set of applications of the parental notice and bypass
law." Id. at 702-03. She has proposed that
the term 'operational challenge' be adopted to identify an across-the-
board constitutional challenge to an operating statutory scheme when:
a) that challenge is based on empirical evidence as to the statute's oper-
ating record drawn from the totality of statutory applications; and
b) the statute in question is or previously has been held valid on its
face.
Id, at 703.
52. In H.L. v. Matheson, Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion cited two
articles from psychiatric literature as support for the proposition that "the emo-
tional and psychological effects of the pregnancy and abortion experience are
markedly more severe in girls under 18 than in adults." Matheson, 450 U.S. at
411 n.20. As one commentator has noted, both articles were published prior to
the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, when elective abortions were difficult to
obtain. Bersoff, Autonomy for Vulnerable Populations: The Supreme Court's Reckless
Disregard for Self-Determination and Social Science, 37 VILL. L. REV. - (1992)
(forthcoming Nov. of 1992). The first article limited its study to therapeutic
7
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presented the Court with an opportunity to review the constitutionality
of imposing requirements in addition to those suggested in Bellotti I. 5
Much of the data that had been accumulated on the burdens and bene-
fits of statutes mandating parental involvement or requiring waiting pe-
riods was relevant to the constitutionality of the Ohio statute at issue in
Ohio v. Akron Center, but no data was available regarding the impact of
some provisions of that statute.M
III. DISCUSSION
A. Procedural Background and Holdings
1. Proceedings in Lower Federal Courts
The Minnesota statute at issue in Hodgson provided, in subdivision
2, that no abortion was to be performed on an unemancipated minor
until at least forty-eight hours after both of her parents had been noti-
fied. 55 The statute did allow for certain exceptions to the notice re-
quirement. 5 6 Additionally, another part of the statute provided that if a
court enjoined the enforcement of subdivision 2, notice to both parents
was required unless a court of competent jurisdiction ordered the abor-
tion to proceed without notice upon proof by the minor that she was
"mature and capable of giving informed consent" or that an abortion
abortions-abortions where the woman's health was endangered by continua-
tion of the pregnancy. Id. The authors of that study admitted that it was socio-
logically and methodologically skewed. Id. The second article consisted of
"unsystematic psychoanalytic impressions of a sample of adolescents who car-
ried their pregnancies to term." Id.
Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Matheson cited a large number of
sources from medical and mental health literature. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 438
nn.24-26 After the Matheson decision in 1980, more methodologically sound re-
search was conducted that was directly relevant to the questions faced by the
Hodgson Court. See infra note 117. In addition, data was collected on the actual
operation of statutes mandating parental involvement and providing for judicial
bypass mechanisms. See infra notes 117-18, 148-49 & 184 and accompanying
text.
53. For a discussion of these additional requirements, see infra notes 63-65
and accompanying text.
54. No data was available because the Ohio statute had not yet been put
into operation. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
55. MINN. STAT. § 144.343(2)-(7) (1988). Subdivision 2 provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 13.02, subdivision 8, no abortion op-
eration shall be performed upon an unemancipated minor ... until at least 48
hours after written notice of the pending operation has been delivered in the
manner specified in subdivisions 2 to 4." Id.
56. Id. § 144.343(4). Subdivision 4 provides that the two-parent notice re-
quirement is mandatory unless: (1) a physician certifies that an immediate abor-
tion is necessary to prevent the woman's death and there is insufficient time to
provide the required notice; (2) both of her parents have consented in writing;
or (3) the woman declares that she is a victim of parental abuse or neglect, in
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without notice to both parents was in her best interests. 5 7 Two days
before the statute's effective date, a group consisting of doctors, clinics,
pregnant minors and the mother of a pregnant minor filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, alleging that
the statute violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment.58 The court declared the statute unconstitu-
tional and enjoined its enforcement. 59 The United States Court of Ap-
57. Id. § 144.343(6). Subdivision 6 provides:
If subdivision 2 of this law is ever temporarily or permanently re-
strained or enjoined by ajudicial order, subdivision 2 shall be enforced
as though the following paragraph were incorporated as paragraph (c)
of that subdivision;...
(c) (i) If such a pregnant woman elects not to allow the notification
of one or both of her parents or guardian or conservator, any judge of a
court of competent jurisdiction shall, upon petition, or motion, and af-
ter an appropriate hearing, authorize a physician to perform the abor-
tion if said judge determines that the pregnant woman is mature and
capable of giving informed consent to the proposed abortion. If said
judge determines that the pregnant woman is not mature, or if the
pregnant woman does not claim to be mature, the judge shall deter-
mine whether the performance of an abortion upon her without notifi-
cation of her parents, guardian, or conservator would be in her best
interests and shall authorize a physician to perform the abortion with-
out such notification if said judge concludes that the pregnant woman's
best interests would be served thereby.
Id.
It should be noted that in reviewing a parental consent statute, the Bellotti II
Court stated that if the minor was not capable of making the abortion decision
independently, the judge should determine in the alternative proceeding
whether the abortion is in the minor's best interests. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 644.
The Minnesota parental notification statute requires the judge to determine
whether an abortion without notice to both parents is in the minor's best interest.
MINN. STAT. § 144.343(6) (1988).
58. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756 (D. Minn. 1986). "OnJuly 31,
1981, the court temporarily restrained enforcement of subdivision 2 of the stat-
ute, but denied plaintiff's motion for an order temporarily restraining enforce-
ment of subdivision 6." Id. at 760. "On March 22, 1982, the court preliminarily
enjoined subdivision 2 but denied a preliminary injunction of subdivision 6." Id.
"By virtue of those two rulings, the parental notification requirement and the
judicial bypass option of subdivision 6 went into effect on August 1, 1981," and
remained in effect throughout the trial. Id.
59. Id. at 781. The district court held that without the judicial bypass op-
tion of subdivision 6, the Minnesota statute would unduly burden a minor's right
to seek an abortion. Id. at 773. It found that with the judicial bypass option, the
statute imposed a substantial burden that was "not justified by the state's inter-
est in encouraging intra-family communication and protecting immature minors
because [the statute] fails to further either of those interests in any meaningful
way." Id. at 776. Nevertheless, the court felt bound by the Supreme Court's
holdings in Bellotti II and Ashcroft. Id. at 776. The district court opined that "it
[was] not [its] place to determine whether the facts actually demonstrated at trial
comport or conflict with any assumptions the Supreme Court may have made,"
but rather, "[t]he Supreme Court directs that this court's inquiry be limited in-
stead to an issue purely of statutory construction: whether Minnesota provides a
judicial alternative that is consistent with established legal standards." Id. at
776-77. The court held that the Minnesota statute satisfied those standards, and
9
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peals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed.6 0 Although the
court rejected the State's contention that the two-parent notice require-
ment of subdivision 2 was constitutional without any bypass procedure,
it held that subdivision 6 was valid and that its bypass procedure saved
the statute as a whole.6 1 The court also rejected the argument that the
forty-eight hour waiting period imposed a significant burden on the mi-
nor's abortion right. 6 2
The Ohio statute at issue in Ohio v. Akron Center made it a crime for a
person to perform an abortion on an unmarried, unemancipated minor,
unless: (1) the person performing the abortion had given twenty-four
hours actual notice to the minor's parent or guardian; (2) one of the
minor's parents or her guardian had consented in writing; (3) a court
order had been issued authorizing the abortion in the absence of paren-
tal notification; or (4) the court had constructively authorized the minor
to consent to the abortion through the court's inaction. 63 To obtain a
judicial bypass of the notice requirement, the minor was required to
present clear and convincing proof that she had sufficient maturity and
information to make the abortion decision herself, that one of her par-
ents had engaged in a pattern of physical, emotional or sexual abuse
against her, or that notice was not in her best interest.6 4 In addition, the
statute: allowed the physician to give constructive notice if actual notice
therefore, it upheld the constitutionality of Minnesota's notification and bypass
requirements. Id. at 777.
The district court, however, found that the provision of the Minnesota stat-
ute requiring that both parents be notified, even when the nuclear family unit
either had broken apart or never formed, failed to further the state's interest and
was therefore unconstitutional. Id at 778. It also found the 48 hour delay re-
quirement unconstitutional because it was "unreasonable" and unduly bur-
dened the pregnant minor. Id. at 779-80. The court found that the 48 hour
delay provision was severable, but that the requirement that both parents be
notified was not; it therefore enjoined the state from enforcing the statute in its
entirety. Id. at 780-81.
60. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988). A panel of the
court of appeals had initially affirmed the judgment of the district court, but the
court granted a rehearing en banc. Id. at 1453.
61. Id. at 1457-62. The court of appeals stated that "[t]he Supreme Court
has ... recognized as a matter of law that parental notice or consent requirements
do not unconstitutionally burden a minor's abortion right when an appropriate
judicial bypass is in place." Id. at 1459 (emphasis added). The court concluded
that the statute complied with the standards set forth in Bellotti II and that, there-
fore, it was bound to hold the statute constitutional. Id. at 1462. The court
opined that any added burden imposed by the requirement that both parents (as
opposed to one parent) be notified was negated by the judicial bypass mecha-
nism. Id. at 1463.
62. Id. at 1465 (concluding that "delay requirement as a part of the overall
statutory scheme [was not] significant burden in light of Minnesota's interest in
ensuring that notification results in parental involvement").
63. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12 (Anderson 1990) (as amended by
Ohio Amended Substitute House Bill 319).
64. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.85 (Anderson 1990) (as enacted by Ohio
Amended Substitute House Bill 319).
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to the parent proved impossible "after a reasonable effort"; required the
minor to file a bypass complaint in the juvenile court on prescribed
forms; mandated expedited bypass hearings, decisions and appellate re-
view; and specified that both courts must maintain the minor's anonym-
ity and the confidentiality of all papers. 65 Shortly before the statute's
effective date, the appellees66 filed a facial challenge to the statute's con-
stitutionality in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio, which ultimately issued an injunction preventing the statute's
enforcement. 67 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed, finding six constitutional defects among the various provi-
sions of the statute.68
2. Supreme Court Holdings
In Hodgson, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and
O'Connor held that subdivision 2 of the Minnesota statute, requiring
two-parent notification with no provision for a judicial bypass proce-
dure, was unconstitutional. 6 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy declared that subdivision 6, pro-
viding for a judicial bypass procedure in the event that subdivision 2 was
invalidated, was constitutional.70 The Court also upheld the constitu-
tionality of the forty-eight hour waiting period. 7 ' Four separate opin-
ions were filed in the case, with a confusing array of partial dissents and
concurrences.
72
65. Id. The Bellotti II plurality had stated that judicial bypass procedures
must provide for expedited hearings and must allow the minor to remain "anon-
ymous." Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 644.
66. Appellees included an abortion facility, one of its doctors, and an un-
married, unemancipated, minor woman seeking an abortion at the facility. Ohio
v. Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2978.
67. Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Rosen, 633 F. Supp. 1123,
1144-45 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
68. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir.
1988). These defects related to the physician's personal obligation to give no-
tice to the minor's parents, the burdensome pleading requirements, the clear
and convincing evidence standard, the confidentiality provisions, the provision
for expedited procedures and the constructive authorization provisions. Id. at
861-69.
69. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2945-47. Thus, the Court indirectly upheld the
application of the Bellotti II framework to notification statutes, at least when noti-
fication must be given to both parents.
70. Id. at 2951 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment in part); id at 2970 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-
senting in part).
71. Justice Kennedy wrote for a plurality in declaring the 48-hour waiting
period constitutional. Id. at 2969 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens, in a portion of his opinion joined only
by Justice O'Connor, also found the 48-hour waiting period constitutional. Id.
at 2944 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J.).
72. The various parts ofJustice Stevens' opinions had differing degrees of
support from the otherJustices. First, in parts I, II, IV and VII, Justice Stevens
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In Ohio v. Akron Center, ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White,
Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy concluded that, on its face, the
Ohio statute did not impose an unconstitutional burden on a minor
seeking an abortion. 7 3
held for the Court that subdivision 2 of the Minnesota statute violated the Con-
stitution insofar as it required two-parent notification without providing a judi-
cial bypass alternative. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and O'Connor
joined these parts of Justice Stevens' opinion. These portions of the opinion
will be cited without a parenthetical phrase following, because they are part of
the majority opinion. Next, parts V and VI of Justice Stevens' opinion, which
described the various interests at stake and upheld the constitutionality of the
48-hour notification requirement, were joined only by Justice O'Connor. Cita-
tions to these parts of his opinion will be followed by the following parenthetical
phrase: (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J.). Third, part III ofJustice Stevens'
opinion discussed the nature of the minor's interest and was joined only byJus-
tice Brennan. Citations to this part ofJustice Stevens' opinion will be followed
by the following parenthetical phrase: (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J.). Fi-
nally, in part VIII of his opinion, Justice Stevens dissented from the holding that
the two-parent notification requirement was made constitutional by the provi-
sion of ajudicial bypass option in subdivision 6 of the Minnesota statute. Cita-
tions to this part of Justice Stevens' opinion will be followed by the following
parenthetical phrase: (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
Justice O'Connor concurred that two-parent notice without ajudicial bypass
provision was unconstitutional, and joined in that part ofJustice Stevens opin-
ion. She also concurred in the judgment that two-parent notice with a judicial
bypass provision was constitutional. Citations to her opinion will therefore be
followed by the following parenthetical phrase: (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment).
Justice Marshall concurred that two-parent notice without bypass was un-
constitutional and joined in that part ofJustice Stevens' opinion. He dissented
from the holdings that two-parent notice with a bypass provision was constitu-
tional and that the 48-hour notice provision was constitutional. His opinion was
joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun. Citations to Justice Marshall's opin-
ion will be followed by the following phrase: (Marshall, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment that two-parent notice with by-
pass was constitutional, concurred in the judgment that 48-hour notice was con-
stitutional and dissented from the holding that two-parent notice without bypass
was unconstitutional. His opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and Scalia. Citations to his opinion will be followed by the fol-
lowing phrase: (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
Justice Scalia believed that the Minnesota statute was constitutional with or
without a judicial bypass provision and therefore, citations to his opinion will be
followed by the following phrase: (Scalia,J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
73. Ohio v. Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2977-83. Justice Kennedy wrote for
the majority in parts I, II, III and IV of his opinion; part V of his opinion was
joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia. IdL at 2977-84.
Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 2984. Justice Stevens wrote an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Id. at 2994-95. Jus-
tice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion that was joined byJustices Brennan and
Marshall. Id. at 2984-94.
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B. Minor's Interest and Standard of Review
In Hodgson, the Court reaffirmed the holding that minors have a
constitutionally protected interest in making the decision to have an
abortion. 74 The majority opinions in Hodgson and Ohio v. Akron Center,
however, applied a different standard of review than had been applied in
prior cases.75 Earlier cases had suggested that statutes impinging on a
minor's right to an abortion should be subject to a "significant state in-
terest test" or "intermediate scrutiny." 76 The opinions in Hodgson and
74. As stated by Justice Marshall, the Hodgson decision "reaffirms the vitality
of Roe, as five justices have voted to strike down a state law restricting a woman's
right to have an abortion." Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2952 (Marshall, J., concurring
in part, concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
There was no consensus among the justices, however, as to the correct
characterization of the minor's constitutionally protected interest. In a section
of his opinion joined only by Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens simply stated that
"the constitutional protection against unjustified state intrusion into the process
of deciding whether or not to bear a child extends to pregnant minors as well as
adult women." Id. at 2937 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J.). Justice
O'Connor characterized the interest as a "liberty interest." Id. at 2949
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). justice Marshall
characterized the pregnant minor's interest as a "fundamental right." Id. at
2951-52 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part). In writing for the majority in Ohio v. Akron Center, justice
Kennedy stated, "[w]e do not need to determine whether a statute that does not
accord with [Danforth, Bellotti II, Matheson, Ashcroft and Akron v. Akron Center] vio-
lates the Constitution, for we conclude that H.B. 319 is consistent with them."
Ohio v. Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2978. Therefore, he did not directly address
the characterization of a minor's constitutional right to seek an abortion.
75. For a discussion of the standard of review applied in the majority opin-
ions, see infra notes 82-97 and accompanying text.
76. In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that regulation of an adult woman's
choice to abort could be justified only by a "compelling state interest," and that
"legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake." 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). In Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth, the Court held that state statutes regulating a minor's decision over an
abortion need only further a "significant" state interest rather than a "compel-
ling" state interest. 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (requiring "significant state interest
in conditioning an abortion.., that is not present in the case of an adult"). See
also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1977) (stating that
lesser scrutiny applies to regulation of activities of minors because minors pos-
sess diminished capacity for making important decisions and commenting that
''significant" state interest test is less rigorous than "compelling" state interest
test applicable to restraints on privacy rights of adults). In Bellotti II the Court
declared that if a "significant" state interest is present, then "the constitutional
rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults." 443 U.S. 622, 634
(1979). In H.L. v. Matheson, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a parental
notification statute because it "plainly serve[d] important state interests [and]
[was] narrowly drawn to protect only those interests." 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981).
In Akron v. Akron Center, the majority of the Court maintained the distinction of
demanding that a state possess a "compelling" interest to regulate an adult's
right to an abortion while requiring only a "significant" interest to restrict the
same right in the case of a minor. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 427-28 n.10 (1983).
Requiring the state to demonstrate a significant interest appears to repre-
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Ohio v. Akron Center, however, covered the full spectrum. At one extreme
was Justice Marshall, who stated that "[n]either the scope of a woman's
privacy right nor the magnitude of a law's burden is diminished because
a woman is a minor." 77 Justice Marshall thus favored the same strict
scrutiny test, "requiring a State to show that such a law is narrowly
drawn to serve a compelling interest," that he would apply to statutes
regulating an adult woman's abortion decision. 78 At the other extreme
was Justice Scalia, who asserted that "the Constitution contains no right
to abortion," 79 and hence would not subject legislation regulating abor-
tion to judicial review.80 Justice Blackmun's view fit between the two
extremes, favoring a "significant state interest test" or "intermediate
scrutiny." 81
None of these positions, however, was embraced by a majority of
the Court. In delivering the Court's opinion in Hodgson holding uncon-
stitutional the portion of the Minnesota statute requiring notice to both
parents of the pregnant minor without a bypass procedure, Justice Ste-
vens stated that it "[did] not reasonably further any legitimate state in-
terest."82 He reiterated this standard in his concurring opinion in Ohio
sent an intermediate level of scrutiny, greater than the "rational relation" test
and less than the "compelling state interest" test. Lindsey, supra note 18, at 889
n.49. The district court in Hodgson applied an intermediate scrutiny, significant
state interest test. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 771-72 (D. Minn.
1986). The concept of intermediate scrutiny is not new; it consistently has been
employed in gender discrimination cases under the equal protection clause. See,
e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) ("classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives.").
77. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2952; see also Matheson, 450 U.S. at 442 n.32 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) ("Although it may seem that the minor's privacy right is
somehow less fundamental because it may be overcome by a 'significant state
interest,' the more sensible view is that the state interests inapplicable to adults
may justify burdening the minor's right.").
78. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2952 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring
in judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall has consistently
viewed this as the proper standard. See, e.g., Matheson, 450 U.S. at 441.
79. Ohio v. Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2984 (Scalia, J., concurring). In his
concurring opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, Justice Scalia advo-
cated expressly overruling Roe v. Wade 490, 492 U.S. 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment).
80. Justice Scalia advocates deference to the legislature in this area. Ohio v.
Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2984 (Scalia, J., concurring).
8 1. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that
[a]lthough the Court "has recognized that the State has somewhat
broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults,"
in doing so, the State nevertheless must demonstrate that there is a
"significant state interest in conditioning an abortion.., that is not pres-
ent in the case of an adult."
Id. (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75 (emphasis added injustice Blackmun's
opinion)). Justice Blackmun's standard is the one most firmly rooted in the
Court's prior opinions. For a discussion of the dominance of the significant
state interest standard, see supra note 76.
82. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2945.
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v. Akron Center. 83 In delivering the plurality opinion in Hodgson that held
subdivision 6 to be constitutional, Justice Kennedy never clearly stated
what standard should be applied. 8 4 He did state that the statute "repre-
sents a permissible, reasoned attempt to preserve the parents' role in a
minor's decision to have an abortion without placing any absolute obsta-
cles before a minor who is determined to elect an abortion." 8 5 In his
opinion in Ohio v. Akron Center, Justice Kennedy concluded that "[tihe
Ohio statute ... does not impose an undue, or otherwise unconstitu-
tional, burden on a minor seeking an abortion[,] ... [and] the legislature
acted in a rational manner in enacting [the Ohio statute]." 8 6
Justice Kennedy's language suggests that he was using the standard
that has been advocated consistently by Justice O'Connor.8 7 In Hodgson,
justice O'Connor, who was the swing vote in declaring subdivision 2
unconstitutional and subdivision 6 constitutional, reiterated this stan-
dard by quoting her dissenting opinion from City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health: "If the particular regulation does not 'unduly
burde[n]' the fundamental right .... then our evaluation of that regula-
tion is limited to our determination that the regulation rationally relates
to a legitimate state purpose." 8 8 Due to the changing composition of
.83. Ohio v. Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2993 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment) ("The State may presume that, in most... applica-
tions, the statute will reasonably further its legitimate interest in protecting the
welfare of its minor citizens.").
84. Justice Kennedy initially referred to "applying the standards established
in our prior decisions to the case at hand," but he did not directly state those
standards. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2966 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
85. Id at 2969 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part). At another point, Justice Kennedy stated that the Minnesota law "does
not place an absolute obstacle before any minor seeking to obtain an abortion,
and it represents a considered weighing of the competing interests of minors
and their parents." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) He also quoted Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion from Ak-
ron v. Akron Center: "It cannot be doubted that as long as a state statute is within
'the bounds of reason and [does not] assum[e] the character of a merely arbi-
trary fiat ... [then] [t]he State... must decide upon measures that are needful
for the protection of its people .... '" Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 459 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)) (cita-
tion omitted).
86. Ohio v. Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2983 (Kennedy,J., joined ChiefJustice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia). This portion of Kennedy's opinion
was not endorsed by a majority of the Court.
87. Justice O'Connor's standard was first advanced in her dissenting opin-
ion in Akron v. Akron Center. Akron v. Akron Center, 462 U.S. at 453 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). She restated the standard in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986), and in Webster v. Re-
productive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 529-30 (1989) (O'ConnorJ, concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment).
88. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2949-50 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment in part) (alteration by Court) (quoting Akron v. Akron
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the Court, Justice O'Connor in 1989 became the swing vote in cases
reviewing abortion legislation,8 9 and thus, her two stage standard of re-
view became outcome determinative. 90 She has advocated an initial de-
termination of whether the state regulation "unduly burdens" the
pregnant woman's choice.91 If the regulation is "unduly burdensome,"
then the "heightened scrutiny" standard of review should be applied. 92
Otherwise, the Court should limit itself to a determination of whether
the regulation "rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose."'93
In short, it appears that in declaring that the Minnesota statute was
unconstitutional if it lacked a bypass procedure, the Court was using a
Center, 462 U.S. at 453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). Justice O'Connor character-
ized the right at stake as a "liberty interest" and stated that the minor's liberty
interest was different from the adult's in that "[p]arental notice and consent are
qualifications that typically may be imposed by the state on the minor's right to
make important decisions." Id. at 2949 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment in part) (quoting Bellotti I1, 443 U.S. 622, 640-41
(1979)).
89. L. TRIBE, ABORTrON: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 23-24 (1990) ("With
four apparent votes to overturn Roe and four to uphold it, Justice O'Connor
became the swing vote on the permissibility of state abortion legislation.").
90. The composition of the Court changed again in 1990 when Justice
Brennan retired and Justice Souter was appointed to the Court. In Webster, four
Justices upheld a Missouri statute on the ground that the right to decide whether
to terminate a pregnancy merits no special protection from the government. L.
TRIBE, supra note 89, at 23. Because Justice Brennan was not one of the four,
Justice Souter could become a fifth vote against protecting the right to choose
an abortion. The fifth vote also could be provided by Justice Thomas who in
1991 replaced Justice Marshall on the Court.
In a recent decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit stated that Justice O'Connor's standard was the standard for lower federal
courts to apply when reviewing abortion legislation. Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 691-98 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3498
(1992).
9 1. "An undue burden will generally be found 'in situations involving abso-
lute obstacles or severe limitations on the abortion decision,' not wherever a
state regulation 'may "inhibit" abortions to some degree.'" Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Akron v. Akron Center, 462 U.S. at 464).
92. This position was explained more fully in Thornburgh:
[Jiudicial scrutiny of state regulation of abortion should be limited to
whether the state law bears a rational relationship to legitimate pur-
poses such as the advancement of these compelling interests (in ensur-
ing maternal health and in protecting potential life] with heightened
scrutiny reserved for instances in which the State has imposed an "un-
due burden" on the abortion decision.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting); cf. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756 (D.
Minn. 1986) (district court squarely rejecting idea that "undue burden" is neces-
sary to trigger heightened scrutiny).
93. Hodgson, I10 S. Ct. at 2949-50 (quoting Akron v. Akron Center, 462 U.S. at
453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). The rational relation standard is the lowest
standard used by the Court and the easiest for the state to overcome. L. TRIBE,
supra note 89, at 10-11 (noting that "choice of which test to apply usually re-
solves the case").
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standard of review akin to the second part of justice O'Connor's stan-
dard. Although Justice Stevens used the language "reasonably further"
rather than "rationally relate," the two phrases are generally viewed as
equivalent.94 In applying this "rational basis test," however, the Court
engaged in a more intense scrutiny of the statute than is traditional
when the rational basis test applies.9 5 Such focused scrutiny under the
rational basis test has been called "rational means scrutiny with bite."9 6
In upholding the constitutionality of the Minnesota statute with a judi-
cial bypass procedure, and in upholding the constitutionality of the
Ohio statute, a majority of the Court determined that the statutes did
not "unduly burden" the pregnant minor's choice and were "rationally
related to a legitimate state purpose." 9
7
C. Evaluating the Statutes
1. The Minnesota Statute
Even apart from differences regarding the appropriate standard of
review, there was wide disagreement among the Justices as to the proper
analytic approach to be used in examining the constitutionality of the
Minnesota statute.9 8 Specifically, Justice Kennedy favored a facial con-
stitutional analysis and relied on judicial precedent, history and the
"pages of human experience." 99 In contrast, Justice Marshall analyzed
94. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-2 to -3, at 1439-40,
1443 (2d ed. 1988).
95. There are "less than a handful" of recent cases in which the Court has
overturned legislation while applying the rational basis test. Turkington, Consti-
tutional Limitations on Tort Reform: Have the State Courts Placed Insurmountable Obsta-
cles in the Path of Legislative Responses to the Perceived Liability Crisis, 32 VILL. L. REV.
1299, 1310 n.33 (1987). The "rationality" that the Court has required has been
said to be a "species of hypothetical rationality in which the Court imagines
whether there is any state of affairs under which the legislative decision could
serve the asserted purpose." L. TRIBE, supra note 94, § 16-2 at 1440. In spite of
this low level of scrutiny, the Court held that a portion of the Minnesota statute
was unconstitutional.
96. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972). Although that arti-
cle focused on equal protection, Gunther notes that the means-oriented analysis
is relevant to due process as well. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL Lw 458, n. 1I
(11 th ed. 1985). Rational means scrutiny with bite
would have the Court "assess the means in terms of legislative pur-
poses that have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture,"
and "would have the Justices gauge the reasonableness of questionable
means on the basis of materials that are offered to the Court, rather
than resorting to rationalizations created by perfunctory judicial
hypothesizing."
Id. (quoting Gunther, supra, at I.)
97. For a discussion of the Court's adoption of this standard, see supra
notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
98. For a discussion of the disagreement among the Justices, see infra notes
148-234 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2968-69 (Kennedy,J., concurring injudg-
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the burdens and benefits of the statute "as applied," and supported his
analysis with empirical data and the district court's findings of fact.100
Justice Stevens, in announcing the decision of the Court, took an inter-
mediate approach, 01 as did Justice O'Connor. 10 2 Justice Scalia merely
reiterated his belief that the Court has no business reviewing the deci-
sions of the legislature regarding abortion.' 08
In evaluating the constitutionality of the Minnesota statute, it was
necessary for the Court to examine: (1) the legitimacy of the state pur-
poses or interests; (2) the degree to which the statute burdened the mi-
nor's right to privacy; and (3) the degree to which the statute furthered
the state's interests.' 0 4
a. Legitimate State Purposes or Interests
A variety of different interests have been asserted as justifications
for the interference with a minor's right to privacy that occurs when the
state mandates parental notice or consent.' 0 5 The interests discussed in
ment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602
(1979)). For a more detailed discussion ofJustice Kennedy's method of analysis,
see infra notes 153, 167-69 & 230-34 and accompanying text.
100. For a discussion of Justice Marshall's method of analysis, see infra
notes 150-52, 155-56 & 212-29 and accompanying text.
101. For a discussion ofJustice Stevens' method of analysis, see infra notes
170-77 & 185-204 and accompanying text.
102. For a discussion of Justice O'Connor's method of analysis, see infra
notes 178-83 & 205-11.
103. Justice Scalia stated that "the tools for this job are not to be found in
the lawyer's-and hence not in the judge's-workbox." Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at
2961 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). He criti-
cized the distinctions made by the Court because they were not based on the text
of the Constitution. Id. at 2960-61 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
104. These examinations are particularly neccessary given Justice
O'Connor's standard, but the same general framework could be used with any of
the standards used by the Court. For a discussion of the different standards, see
supra notes 75-97 and accompanying text. For example, one could examine
whether the state's interest is "compelling" rather than whether its purpose is
"legitimate" and whether the statute is "narrowly tailored to serve the state's
interest" rather than whether it "reasonably relates" to the state's interest.
Although the standard used by the Court refers to legitimate state "pur-
poses," the Justices focused on the state "interests" that the statutes purport-
edly served.
105. The plurality in Bellotti II suggested three reasons that might permit
states to infringe upon a minor's privacy and liberty in ways that would be un-
constitutional if applied to adults: "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the im-
portance of the parental role in childrearing." Belloti II, 443 U.S. 622, 634
(1979).
In Hodgson, the district court found that:
The Minnesota legislature had several purposes in mind when it
amended Minn. Stat. § 144.343 in 1981. The primary purpose was to
protect the well-being of minors by encouraging minors to discuss with
their parents the decision whether to terminate their pregnancies. En-
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Hodgson as justifications for the Minnesota statute fit into two broad cate-
gories:10 6 1) the state's interest in the welfare of the child 10 7 and 2) the
state's interest in protecting the rights of the parents in the upbringing
of their child.' 0 8 Although the Court was presented with a substantial
body of empirical data that was relevant to the validity of these inter-
ests, 10 9 the Court's use of this data was haphazard at best."10 Justice
Stevens treated the family's right to privacy as a third interest, distinct
couraging such discussion was intended to achieve several salutory [sic]
results. Parents can provide emotional support and guidance and thus
forestall irrational and emotional decision-making. Parents can also
provide information concerning the minor's medical history of which
the minor may not be aware. Parents can also supervise post-abortion
care. In addition, parents can support the minor's psychological well-
being and thus mitigate adverse psychological sequelae that may attend
the abortion procedure.
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 765-66 (D. Minn. 1986). The district
court also found that the legislature was motivated by "a desire to deter and
dissuade minors from choosing to terminate their pregnancies." Id. at 766. It
found that "[t]estimony before a legislative committee considering the proposed.
notification requirement indicated that influential supporters of the measure
hoped it 'would save lives' by influencing minors to carry their pregnancies to
term rather than aborting." Id.
The interest in "potential life" is presumably no greater in the case of a
pregnant minor than it is in the case of an adult. Because the state's interest in
potential life is not sufficient in the early stages of pregnancy to justify state
regulation of the decisions of adult women, the interest in potential life should
not be sufficient to justify regulating the decisions of minors. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
106. Justice Kennedy noted that the state identified two interests served by
the law: 1) an interest in the welfare of pregnant minors, and 2) protection of
the right of each parent to participate in the upbringing, of his or her own chil-
dren. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2962 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
One commentator has suggested that
the legitimate and competing interests present in the teenage abortion
context involve: (1) a minor's limited constitutional right to choose an
abortion; (2) a state's interest in ensuring that the parents are involved
in the decision; and (3) the parents' interest in participating and aiding
in their child's growth, development, and physical and emotional well-
being.
Lindsey, supra note 18, at 888. In the cases, however, the Court actually has
addressed the state's interest in intervention to protect the minor or to facilitate
the interests of the parents. The minor's privacy right must therefore be mea-
sured against the state's interest in intervention, which is derivative of the mi-
nor's and the parents' interests.
107. For a discussion of the state's interest in the welfare of the child, see
infra notes 112-20.
108. For a discussion of the state's interest in protecting the rights of par-
ents in the upbringing of their child, see infra notes 121-32.
109. For a discussion of this data, see infra notes 117-18 and accompanying
text.
110. For a discussion of the Justices' use, or non-use, of this data and their
conclusions regarding these interests, see infra notes 112-47 and accompanying
text.
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from the second interest above, that weighed against mandatory notifi-
cation of both parents."'
i. The Welfare of the Child
The state's interest in the welfare of the child was recognized by all
of the justices as a legitimate interest. 1 2 Given the language of theJus-
tices' opinions, it primarily appears to be an interest in ensuring that the
minor makes a "knowing and intelligent decision,"' "13 although it also
may be a general concern for the "peculiar vulnerability" of the child. 14
In recognizing the state's interest in the welfare of the child as a legiti-
mate justification for regulation of the abortion decision that is not pres-
ent in the case of adults, the Justices implicitly accepted either the
assumption that minors are less capable than adults of making knowing
and intelligent decisions or the assumption that minors are peculiarly
vulnerable.' 1 5 In doing so, the Justices appear to have relied on "the
I ll. For a discussion of the Justices' divergent treatment of this interest,
see infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
112. Hodgson, I 10 S. Ct. at 2944 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J.)
("[T]he legitimate state interest is ensuring that the minor's decision is knowing
and intelligent."); Id. at 2962 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) ("The welfare of the child has always been the central con-
cern of laws with regard to minors."). The other Justices implicitly have ac-
cepted the legitimacy of this interest by not challenging its legitimacy.
113. Justice Stevens described the interest as the state's "strong and legiti-
mate interest in the welfare of its young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperi-
ence, and lack ofjudgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their
rights wisely." Id. at 2942 (Stevens,J., joined by O'Connor, J.). At a later point,
he stated for the Court that "[t]he usual justification for a parental consent or
notification provision is that it supports the authority of a parent who is pre-
sumed to act in the minor's best interest and thereby assures that the minor's
decision ... is knowing, intelligent, and deliberate." Id. at 2945.
Justice Marshall stated that "[tihe main purpose of the notification require-
ment is to 'protect the well-being of minors by encouraging minors to discuss
with their parents the decision whether to terminate their pregnancies.'" Id. at
2955 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dis-
senting in part) (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 766 (D.
Minn. 1986)). He also stated that the 48-hour delay is designed to provide par-
ents with time to consult with their daughters, and such consultation is intended
to ensure that their daughters' decisions are knowing and intelligent. Id. at 2955(Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
114. This interest could be encompassed under the broad heading of "pro-
tecting the well-being of the child."
115. Justice Stevens explicitly stated that minors' "immaturity, inexperi-
ence, and lack ofjudgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their
rights wisely." Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2942 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J.).
Justice O'Connor cited cases and quoted statements from these cases as support
for the proposition that minors should be treated differently because they are
less capable as decisionmakers. Id. at 2949 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment). Justice Kennedy stated that "[i]egislatures histori-
cally have acted on the basis of the qualitative differences in maturity between
children and adults," and "[a]ge is a rough but fair approximation of maturity
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pages of human experience" and their own common sense notions of
human development. 1 6 A substantial body of research suggests, how-
ever, that most adolescents do have the capacity to make "informed de-
cisions about life situations" and "sound health care decisions,
including decisions about abortions."' 17 In addition, research does not
and judgment." Id. at 2962 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part). He asserted that the legitimacy of the use of age as an ap-
proximation of maturity and of the state's interest in making sure that a child has
her parents' assistance in making a decision as serious as an abortion decision
were settled by previous cases. Id. at 2962 (Kennedy,J., concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (citing H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409-11
(1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 640-41
(1979)).
116. For criticism of the Supreme Court's reliance on the "pages of human
experience," see Melton & Pliner, supra note 25, at 9-23; Perry & Melton, Prece-
dential Value ofJudicial Notice of Social Facts: Parham as an Example, 22J. FAM. L.
633, 645-65 (1983-84); Melton, Children's Competence to Consent. A Problem in Law
and Social Science, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 1, 9-11 (1983).
117. See, Brief for Amicus Curiae, American Psychological Association, Na-
tional Association of Social Workers, Inc., and American Jewish Committee in
support of petitioners/cross respondents, Ohio v. Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. 2972
(Nos. 88-1125, 88-1309) and in support of appellees, Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. 2926
(No. 88-805) at 17-26 (1990) [hereinafter APA Amicus Brief]. Amici Curiae con-
tended that "[p]sychological theory and research about cognitive, social and
moral development strongly supports the conclusion that most adolescents are
competent to make informed decisions about important life situations." Id. at
18. They also contended that "[r]esearch does not support the States' assump-
tion that adolescents typically lack the capacity to make sound health care deci-
sions, including decisions about abortion." Id. at 21; see also 1 NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISKING THE FUTURE: ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY, PREGNANCY,
AND CHILDBEARING 277 (1987) [hereinafter NRC REPORT] ("[O]n the basis of
existing research.., contention that adolescents are unlikely or unable to make
well-reasoned decisions.., is not supported."); Melton & Pliner, supra note 25,
at 18.
Conclusions that were drawn from a review of research and contained in an
earlier amicus curiae brief filed with the Supreme Court by the American Psy-
chological Association (APA), Brief for Amicus Curiae, American Psychological
Association, in support of appellees, Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 484 U.S. 171 (1987)(No. 85-673), had been criticized. Gardner, Scherer & Tester, Asserting Scientific
Authority: Cognitive Development and Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST
895, 897-900 (1989) ("[The brief] legitimately and constructively pointed to the
lack of evidence for the Court's belief that adolescents are incompetent. [It]
stepped too far, however, in claiming that there are authoritative grounds for
the positive assertion that adolescents and adults have equivalent decision-mak-
ing competence."). But see Melton, Knowing What We Do Know: APA and Adolescent
Abortion, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1171, 1171-72 (1990) ("Although Gardner et
al.'s critical tone may lead some readers.., to believe that the APA briefs were
discredited.... the authors raised no criticism at all of much of the content of
the briefs and they accepted the thrust of the argument even in the portion that
they criticized."). The APA's brief filed in Hodgson apparently satisfied some of
the critics of the Zbaraz brief. Scherer & Gardner, Reasserting the Authority of Sci-
ence, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1173, 1174 (1990) (recent APA amicus brief "proves
that a narrowly drawn statement of the current research can be written in spite
of the limits imposed on amicus briefs"). This brief has not satisfied all critics,
however. See Scott,Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37 VILL. L.
16311991] NOTE
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support the assumption regarding the "peculiar vulnerability" of adoles-
cents.1 18 This research was presented to the Court, 119 but none of the
Justices appeared to have been willing to use such research to question
these assumptions regarding the decisionmaking capacity and vulnera-
bility of minors.' 20
ii. Parental Rights
There was substantial disagreement on the Court as to whether the
state could justify its intervention into the abortion decision on the basis
of a parental interest that was separate from the interests of the child. 121
In a part of his opinion in Hodgson that was joined only by Justice
O'Connor, Justice Stevens stated that parents have an interest in con-
trolling the education and upbringing of children which may rise to the
REV. - (1992) (forthcoming Nov. of 1992) (arguing that brief was deficient be-
cause, inter alia, it fails to consider differences between adults and adolescents
that may result in differences in judgment).
Of the research studies relied upon by the American Psychological Associa-
tion in its amicus curiae brief for Hodgson and Ohio v. Akron Center, the most meth-
odologically sound and directly relevant study was one conducted by Bruce
Ambuel. See Ambuel & Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents' Psychological
and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 129 (1992).
118. NRC REPORT, supra note 117, at 277 ([Oin the basis of existing re-
search.., the contention that adolescents... are especially vulnerable to seri-
ous psychological harm as a result of an abortion is not supported."); see also
APA Amicus Brief, supra note 117, at 26-29; Melton & Pliner, supra note 25, at
16-17.
119. The APA's Amicus Brief was cited byJustice Blackmun in Ohio v. Akron
Center. 110 S. Ct. at 2990 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice
Marshall cited some of the specific research noted in the brief. See, e.g., Hodgson,
110 S. Ct. at 2952 (Marshall,J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (referring to psychological study cited in APA brief).
120. Justice Marshall, however, did use the research in examining whether
the statute furthered the state's purpose. See infra notes 212-29.
121. For a discussion of this disagreement, see infra notes 122-32 and ac-
companying text. This question has been debated before. In Bellotti II, Justice
Powell insisted that the "tradition of parental authority" was "one of the basic
presuppositions" of individual liberty. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979). He
noted, however, that the abortion context justified significant curtailment of the
traditional parental authority: "The need to preserve the constitutional right
and the unique nature of the abortion decision, especially when made by a mi-
nor, require a State to act with particular sensitivity when it legislates to foster
parental involvement in this matter." Id.
One commentator reported that at oral argument in Hodgson and Ohio v.
Akron Center, "tempers flared" between Justices O'Connor and Scalia as Justice
O'Connor focused on the best interest of the minor and Justice Scalia focused
on the parents' "right to know." L. TRiBE, supra note 89, at 200-01.
This debate was also evident on the appellate level in the Hodgson litigation,
where the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "the district court did not
consider whether parental and family interests (as distinguished from the inter-
ests of the minor alone) justified the two-parent notice requirement." Hodgson
v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452, 1463 (8th Cir. 1988).
1632 [Vol. 36: p. 1611
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level of a liberty interest.' 22 He asserted for the majority, however, that
''any state interest in protecting a parent's interest in shaping a child's
values and lifestyle [cannot] overcome the liberty interests of a minor
acting with the consent of a single parent or court,"' 123 because "the
justification for any rule requiring parental involvement in abortion de-
cisions rests entirely on the best interests of the child."' 2 4 This suggests
that he perceived the parent's interest in involvement as not being in-
dependent of the child's interests, but rather, as being derived from the
best interests of the child. Justice Marshall viewed the parents' interest
as a very limited one; he did not believe that protection of a parental
interest independent of the child's interests was a valid justification for
state intervention. 12 5 He asserted that the right to direct a child's up-
bringing was a right against state interference with family matters,1 2 6 and
even if the state was only attempting to facilitate the exercise of parental
authority, any such regulations must be narrowly drawn. 12 7 Justice
Blackmun, dissenting in Ohio v. Akron Center, also believed that the in-
dependent interest of the parent was very limited.
128
In contrast to Justices Marshall, Blackmun and StevensJustice Ken-
nedy stressed the state's interest in the "[p]rotection of the right of each
parent to participate in the upbringing of her or his own children"' 2 9 as
122. Hodson, 110 S. Ct. at 2942 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J.). Jus-
tice Stevens differentiated this interest from the family's privacy interest. See in-
fra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
123. Id. at 2946 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J.)
124. Id. at 2947 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J.).
125. Id. at 2956 (Marshall,J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (addressing state's asserted "interest of protecting
parents' independent nght 'to shape the[ir] child[ren]'s values and life style(s]'
and 'to determine and strive for what they believe to be best for their children'"
and concluding that "where parental involvement threatens to harm the child,
the parent's authority must yield").
126. Id. at 2956 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part). For a discussion of this family interest, see infra
notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
127. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall went on to state that "[moreover, as a
practical matter, 'state intervention is hardly likely to resurrect parental author-
ity that the parents themselves are unable to preserve.' " Id. (Marshall, J., con-
curring in part, concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 448 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
128. Ohio v. Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2984 (Blackmun,J. dissenting) (citing
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), as support for proposition
that "[alny independent interest the parent may have in the termination of the
minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the
competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant").
129. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2962 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part). Justice Keninedy stated that "[a] State pursues a
legitimate end under the Constitution when it attempts to foster and preserve
the parent-child relation by giving all parents the opportunity to participate in
the care and nurture of their children." Id. at 2963 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part). One flaw in this argument, however, is
16331991] NOTE
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a justification for the notification statute. As support for this interest,
Justice Kennedy stated that "[t]he common law historically has given
recognition to the right of parents, not merely to be notified of their
children's actions, but to speak and act on their behalf."' 30 Although
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that "[l]imitations have emerged on the
prerogatives of parents to act contrary to the best interest of the child,"
he stated that "[t]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect a
strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of
their children."'' Furthermore, he stated that "parents have a liberty
interest, protected by the Constitution, in having a reasonable opportu-
nity to develop close relations with their children."' 3 2
Parallelling this difference in opinion regarding the importance of
the parental interest, and perhaps contributing to its explanation, was a
difference in the frames of reference of the Justices. Justice Kennedy
asserted that "[a] State may seek to protect and facilitate the parent-
child bond on the assumption that parents will act in their child's best
interest."' 13 3 He believed that the state may legislate based on its con-
ception of the ideal family and need not look at the realities of contem-
that the parents' "opportunity" exists whether the state intervenes or not. Cf.
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 448 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("state
intervention is hardly likely to resurrect parental authority that parents them-
selves [were] unable to preserve").
130. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2962 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part). As authority for this proposition, Justice Kennedy
cited treatises from the 19th century. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy also cited other state and fed-
eral laws as support for the notion that the state has an interest in keeping both
parents informed. Id. at 2964-65 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
131. Id. at 2962-63 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)). The
other Justices focused more on those families where there was not as much
"concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children." Id. For a discussion
of this difference in focus, see infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
132. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2963 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part). It would seem that this is a right against state intru-
sion and not a justification for state intrusion. Id. at 2956 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring in part, concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("It is a
strange constitutional alchemy that would transform a limitation on state power
into a justification for governmental intrusion into family interactions.").
133. Id. at 2963 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part). Kennedy emphasized supportive families:
[I]t was reasonable for the legislature to conclude that in most cases
notice to both parents will work to the minor's benefit .... This is true
not only in what the Court calls the 'ideal family setting,' where both
parents and the minor live under one roof, but also where the minor no
longer lives with both parents .... [M]any absent parents maintain
significant ties with their children, and seek to participate in their lives,
to guide, to teach, and to care for them.
Id. at 2967 (Kennedy,J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part);
see also Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (law may presume parents will
act in child's best interest).
[Vol. 36: p. 16111634
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porary family life.' 3 4 On the other hand, Justices Marshall, Stevens and
O'Connor took judicial notice of the data relating to dysfunctional fami-
lies, 135 and asserted that the state should take these families into ac-
count.' 3 6 They also seemed to support the proposition that the Court
should look at how state legislation actually affects families, 137 whereas
Justice Kennedy suggested that how the family actually responds is "be-
yond the state's control."' 3 8
iii. The Family's Right to Privacy
The Justices discussed a third interest which was relevant to the le-
gitimacy of the state's purpose-the family's interest in privacy in its
134. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2967 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy acknowledged that in some cases
"notifying both parents will not produce desirable results," but he pointed to
the exceptions in the Minnesota statute which he said were "to ensure that the
statutory notice requirement does not apply if it proves a serious threat to the
minor's health or safety." Id. at 2967-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part). He did not acknowledge the limitations of the
abuse exception. But see id. at 2950 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment in part) (abuse exception is "less than effectual" because of
the "abused minor's reluctance to report sexual or physical abuse" and because
of the "likelihood that invoking the abuse exception for the purpose of avoiding
notice will result in notice").
At another point, Justice Kennedy stated that "[ilt is true that for all too
many young women the prospect of two parents, perhaps even one parent, sus-
taining her with support that is compassionate and committed is an illusion."
Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2972 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part). He then stated, however, that the Court should not focus on
these families. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
This debate over focus was also evident in the lower courts in the Hodgson
litigation. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452, 1464 (8th Cir. 1988). The
district court focused on the impact of the statute on pregnant minors not living
with both parents, and the court of appeals stated that the district court had not
given enough consideration to the 50% or more pregnant minors who live with
both parents. Id.
135. Id. at 2938-39, 2950 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment in part); idi at 2955 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
136. Justice Blackmun also felt that the court should take these families into
account. Ohio v. Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2989-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
He said that "[tihe Court's selective blindness to... stark social reality is bewil-
dering and distressing." Id at 2990-91 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He also cau-
tioned that there is " 'another world "out there" ' that the Court 'either chooses
to ignore or refuses to recognize.' " Id. at 2993 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
137. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2938-39 (majority opinion describing findings of
district court on how legislation affects families).
138. Id. at 2964 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part). Justice Kennedy stated that Minnesota has "an interest in seeing
that parents know about a vital decision facing their child .... How the family
unit responds to such notice is, for the most part, beyond the State's control."
Id at 2963-64 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
25
Anderer: Getting the Facts: Empirical Evaluation and the Constitutionality
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
decisionmaking processes.1 39 In Hodgson, Justices Marshall, Stevens and
O'Connor saw this interest as militating against state intrusion.1 40 Jus-
tice Stevens stated in Hodgson that "the family has a privacy interest in
the upbringing and education of children and the intimacies of the mari-
tal relationship which is protected by the Constitution against undue
state interference." 14 1 He therefore concluded that any state interest in
communication among family members was not a legitimate interest,
and could not be used as justification for the parental notice provision in
the Minnesota statute.' 42 Justice O'Connor stated that the Minnesota
statute's interference with a family's decisionmaking process supported
the finding that it was unconstitutional. 143 Justice Kennedy, on the
other hand, opined that the family's interest in its decisionmaking pro-
cess supported the constitutionality of the statute. 144
iv. Conclusion
In a part of his Hodgson opinion joined only by Justice O'Connor,
Justice Stevens concluded that it was only the first interest-the interest
in the welfare of the pregnant minor-that could justify notification of
139. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (plural-
ity opinion) ("Constitution prevents [the state] from standardizing its children-
and its adults-by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family pat-
terns."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (parents have a right to
direct religious upbringing of their children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944) (stating in dicta that Supreme Court decisions "have respected
the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter"); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (Constitution protects "liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (Constitution pro-'
tects right of parents to control education of their children).
This interest is not entirely conceptually distinct from the interest discussed
earlier-the parental interest in controlling the upbringing of his or her child.
Justice Stevens recognized two distinct interests, one being an interest of the
parents and the other being an interest of the family unit, whereas Justices Mar-
shall and Kennedy did not.
140. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2943 (Stevens, J., joined by O'ConnorJ.); id. at
2950 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment in part); id.
at 2956 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
14 1. Id. at 2943 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J.).
142. Id. at 2946 ("[F]ull communication among all members of a family
[may be] desirable in some cases, but such communication may not be decreed
by the State.").
143. Id. at 2950 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment in part) (expressing agreement with Justice Stevens that "Minnesota has
offered no sufficient justification for [the] interference with the family's decision-
making processes created by subdivision 2").
144. Id. at 2962 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part). Justice Kennedy appeared to merge two interests whichJustice Ste-
vens saw as separate: the parental interest in controlling the education and
upbringing of their children and the family's privacy interest. Id. at 2943 (Ste-
vens, J., joined by O'Connor, J.).
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both parents. 145 Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Black-
mun, agreed. 146 Thus, a majority of the Court believed that primarily
the best interests of the minor should be taken into account, and more
particularly, the interest in ensuring that the minor's decision was know-
ing and intelligent. Independent of the minor's interests, the parents
have only a limited interest in the minor's abortion decision.147
b. The Burden
In Hodgson, the District Court was presented with substantial data
regarding the burdens the Minnesota statute presented in actual opera-
tion, and the court made extensive findings of fact based on this data.148
In addition, the Supreme Court was presented with data from research
on the burdens of parental notice, waiting periods and judicial bypass
procedures. 149 Justice Marshall made extensive use of this data in his
analysis of the burdens presented by the statute.150 He concluded that
145. Id. at 2941-44 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J.).
146. Id. at 2955-57 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part).
147. For a discussion of the pareits limited interest in the minor's abortion
decision, see supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
148. As noted earlier, Minnesota's parental notification statute and judicial
bypass procedure went into effect on August 1, 1981. Hodgson v. Minnesota,
648 F. Supp. 756, 760 (D. Minn. 1986). This statutory scheme remained in ef-
fect through the trial and argument in 1986. Id. The district court heard consid-
erable evidence relating to the operation of the statutory scheme, including
statistical evidence, testimony from judges and parents of pregnant minors in-
volved in the bypass hearings, and testimony from psychologists, medical doc-
tors and counselors. Id. at 759-60. The district court made eleven findings that
it specifically placed under the heading of "Burdens." Id. at 763-65. The court
found that the judicial bypass procedure typically resulted in delays that could
impose greater cost, inconvenience and medical risk. Id. at 763. The bypass
procedure produced fear, anxiety, anger, resentment, guilt, shame and other
negative emotions in many minors; some mature minors and minors in whose
best interests it was to proceed without notifying their parents were so intimi-
dated by the judicial proceeding that they avoided the bypass option and noti-
fied their parents or carried to term. Id. at 763-64.
The court found that the two-parent notice requirement necessitated notifi-
cation of non-custodial parents even where the non-custodial parent had exhib-
ited no interest in the minor's development and even where the non-custodial
parent was likely to respond with psychological, sexual or physical violence to-
ward either the minor or the custodial parent. Id. at 764. The two-parent notifi-
cation requirement also burdened minors in two-parent homes who voluntarily
had consulted with one parent but not with the other out of fear of abuse toward
either the minor or the notified parent; such interference with parent-child com-
munication voluntarily initiated was not uncommon. Id. The court further
found that minors were unlikely to avail themselves of the exception to notifica-
tion. Id. Finally, the court found that the 48-hour delay requirement was often
compounded by other factors to result in delays of a week or more which in-
creased the statistical risk of mortality or morbidity and imposed greater cost
and inconvenience. ld at 764-65.
149. APA Amicus Brief, supra note 117, at 7-15.
150. See infra notes 155-66 and accompanying text.
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parental notification and delay "significantly restrict a young woman's
right to reproductive choice"' 5 1 and based his conclusion "not on [his]
intuition about the needs and attitudes of young women, but on a siza-
ble and impressive collection of empirical data documenting the effects
of parental notification statutes and of delaying an abortion."a 52 In con-
trast, Justice Kennedy did not mention this data at all; rather, he relied
on a facial analysis of the constitutionality of the statute. 153 Justices Ste-
vens and O'Connor made selective use of the accumulated data. 54
i. Justice Marshall
Justice Marshall referred to several burdensome consequences of
the parental notification statute. The most basic burden was that "the
notification requirement destroys [the young woman's] right to avoid
disclosure of a deeply personal matter." 155 In addition, Justice Marshall
stated that a notification requirement can have severe physical and psy-
chological effects.' 56 He asserted that forced notification can be emo-
tionally traumatic and even devastating for a young woman, can cause a
woman to delay her abortion, thereby increasing the health risks of the
procedure, and can cause a woman to seek other alternatives with their
attendant risks.' 57 As support for these assertions, Justice Marshall
cited empirical data.' 58
According to Justice Marshall, the forty-eight hour delay require-
ment also posed a significant burden in that it caused increased health
risks.' 59 As evidence of these increased risks, he cited the findings of
the district court that "[d]elay of any length in performing an abortion
increases the statistical risk of mortality and morbidity." 16 0 Justice Mar-
151. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2952 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
152. Id. at 2952 (Marshall,J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
153. See infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 170-83 and accompanying text.
155. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2953 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
156. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
157. Id at 2953-54 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part).
158. This data included journal articles, social science data and medical tes-
timony. See id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
159. Id. at 2954 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
160. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (citing Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 765 (D.
Minn. 1986)). He also cited a book reviewing epidemiological evidence in sup-
port of the proposition that the "rate of major complications nearly doubles in
the week following the end of the first trimester and increases significantly there-
after." Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part and
1638 [Vol. 36: p. 1611
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shall further concluded that the judicial bypass option substantially bur-
dened a woman's right to decisional autonomy.1 61 On its face, the
bypass mechanism in the statute was too burdensome because it gave a
judge an absolute veto over the decision of a physician and her pa-
tient.1 62 It was too burdensome in operation because it (1) caused de-
lay,16 3 (2) caused long travel, 16 4 and (3) was traumatic. 16 5 As evidence
of these burdens, Justice Marshall cited empirical data as embodied in
dissenting in part) (citing C. TIETZE & S. HENSHAW, INDUCED ABORTION: A
WORLD REVIEW 1986, 103-04 (6th ed. 1986)).
161. Id. at 2957-60 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part).
162. Id. at 2957-58 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part). This constitutional defect was exacerbated
by the vagueness of the standards in the statute. Id. at 2957-59 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("The
statute gives no guidance on how a judge is to determine whether a minor is
sufficiently 'mature' and 'capable' . . . [nor] as to how a judge is to determine
whether an abortion without parental notification would serve an immature mi-
nor's 'best interests.' ").
163. Id. at 2958 (Marshall,J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part). To support this proposition, Justice Marshall cited
the findings of the district court that scheduling practices in Minnesota courts
typically result in two or three day delays between the first contact with the court
and a hearing, and may in some cases result in delays of a week or more. Id.
(Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
164. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part). To support this proposition, Justice Marshall cited the
findings of the district court that minors often must travel to another county to
obtain a hearing and the results of an epidemiological study which found that
50%7 of Minnesota minors using the bypass procedure were not residents of the
city in which the court was located. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). He also cited an article for the
proposition that "(iln Minnesota ... minors sometimes have to travel a round-
trip of more than 500 miles for the hearing." Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in
part, concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). The author of that
article, as the basis for his conclusion, cited the epidemiological study cited by
Marshall. Melton, Legal Regulation of Adolescent Abortion: Unintended Effects, 42 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 79, 80 (1987) (citing Donovan,Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare
When They Seek Court-Authorized Abortions, 15 FAM. PLAN. PERSp. 259, 264 (1983)).
Thus, althoughJustice Marshall cited two sources, both of them were relying on
the same data.
165. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2959 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). To support this proposition,
Justice Marshall cited the findings of the district court that the bypass procedure
produced fear, anxiety, anger, resentment, guilt, shame and other negative emo-
tions in many minors, and that some mature minors and minors in whose best
interest it was to proceed without notifying their parents were so intimidated by
the judicial proceeding that they avoided the bypass option and notified their
parents or carried to term. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall also cited specific tes-
timony from Dr. Hodgson and a judge who had heard bypass petitions relating
to the emotional trauma experienced by minors facing bypass procedures. Id.
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the findings of the district court, the testimony at trial and research
studies. 166
ii. Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy concluded that because the Minnesota statute at
issue in Hodgson was in accord with prior decisions, it was constitu-
tional. 16 7 Justice Kennedy explicitly rejected the relevance of the data
on the burdens of the statutory framework: "Our holding [in H.L. v.
Matheson] was made with knowledge of the contentions, supported by
citations to medical and sociological literature, that are proffered again
today for the proposition that notification imposes burdens on mi-
nors." 168 He did not acknowledge that Hodgson differed from prior
cases, such as Matheson, in that the Hodgson Court was presented with
evidence as to the actual operation of the statute. 169
iii. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens quoted extensively from the findings of the district
court in Part IV of his opinion.170 He particularly focused on those find-
ings of the district court relating to the burdens of two-parent notice as
opposed to one-parent notice. 171 In Part VII of his opinion, he stated
for the Court:
The record reveals that in the thousands of dysfunctional fami-
lies affected by this statute, the two-parent notice requirement
proved positively harmful to the minor and her family. The tes-
timony at trial established that this requirement, ostensibly
designed for the benefit of the minor, resulted in major trauma
to the child, and often to a parent as well.' 72
166. Id. at 2958-59 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall has a long history of sup-
porting the use of social science data by the judiciary. He was one of the
attorneys for the appellants in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954). In that case, then-attorney Marshall introduced social science evidence
as to the negative effects of racial segregation on black children. SeeJ. MONAHAN
& L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 134-46 (2d ed.
1990) (discussing use of social science evidence in Brown v. Board of Education).
167. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2965-69 (Kennedy,J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
168. Id. at 2966 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part).
169. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part). For a discussion of the medical literature cited in Matheson, see supra note
52 and accompanying text.
170. Id. at 2938-41.
171. Id. at 2938-39. Justice Stevens apparently believed that if the statute
had provided for one-parent notice, it would have been constitutional. See id. at
2945.
172. Id. at 2945 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J.).
1640 [Vol. 36: p. 1611
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He then proceeded to relate specific testimony and findings that sup-
ported this statement. 173
In Part VI of his opinion, Justice Stevens examined the district
court's findings on the actual impact of the forty-eight hour delay re-
quirement.174 These included the findings that the statute could create
"'in many cases' a delay of a week or more"1 75 and that "[a] delay of
that magnitude increased the medical risk associated with the abortion
procedure to 'a statistically significant degree.' ",176 Despite these find-
ings, Justice Stevens concluded that the forty-eight hour delay require-
ment "imposes only a minimal burden on the right of the minor to
decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."177
iv. Justice O'Connor
The only burden that Justice O'Connor addressed in her concur-
ring opinion was the "interference with the family's decisionmaking
processes created by... two-parent notification."'17 8 She believed this
burden, in the absence of sufficient justification, was enough to invali-
date subdivision 2 of the Minnesota statute, but she made no mention of
the burdens that the statute placed on the minor's individual right to
privacy. 179 She asserted that the judicial bypass procedure "passes con-
stitutional muster because the interference with the internal operation
of the family required by [two-parent notice] simply does not exist
where the minor can avoid notifying one or both parents by use of the
bypass procedure." 80 Justice O'Connor did not address the extensive
evidence on the burdens of the procedure in its actual operation.' 81
173. Id. at 2945-46 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J.). In a footnote,
Justice Stevens discussed the testimony of a judge and a psychologist regarding
the likelihood of notification resulting in abuse in families with a history of do-
mestic violence. Id. at 2945 n.36 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J.).
174. Id. at 2944 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J.).
175. Id at 2940 (citing Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 765 (D.
Minn. 1986)).
176. Id. (citing Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 765).
177. Id at 2944 (Stevens,J.,joined by O'Connor, J.). A conclusion that the
delay is "minimal" seems cavalier in light of the district court's conclusion that
"[d]elay of any length in performing an abortion increases the statistical risk of
mortality and morbidity." Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 765. For a discussion of
Justice Marshall's conclusion from the same data, see supra notes 159-65 and
accompanying text.
178. Id. at 2950 (O'Connor, J, concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment in part). For a discussion of this burden, see supra notes 139-44 and ac-
companying text.
179. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment in
part). Justice O'Connor did state that this was the most stringent notification
statute in the country. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring injudgment in part).
180. Id. at 2951 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment in part).
181. For a discussion of these burdens and Justice Marshall's use of data
1991] NOTE 1641
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She did, however, cite data collected by the district court in Hodgson as
support for her assertion that the exception to notification for minors
who are victims of neglect or abuse was ineffectual in providing an op-
portunity for those minors to avoid notice.182 This selective use of em-
pirical data is difficult to reconcile with a principled approach to
constitutional adjudication.183
c. The Relationship Between the Statute and the State's Interest
The Court was also presented with empirical data and factual find-
ings from the district court relating to the ability of the statutory frame-
work-specifically, parental notification, forty-eight hour notice and
judicial bypass-to further the state's asserted interests.' 8 4 Once again,
relating to these burdens, see supra notes 148-49 & 155-66 and accompanying
text. See also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 763-65 (D. Minn. 1986).
182. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2950 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment in part). Justice O'Connor stated that "[t]he Minnesota ex-
ception to notification for minors who *are victims of neglect or abuse is, in
reality, a means of notifying the parents." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment in part). The findings she cited relate to the reluc-
tance of minors to report sexual or physical abuse. Id. (O'ConnorJ, concurring
in part and concurring in judgment in part).
183. Justice O'Connor's approach is an example of the phenomenon ob-
served by one commentator that: "Courts cite the results of psychological re-
search when they believe it will enhance the elegance of their opinions, as in the
most oft-cited example of Brown v. Board of Education . . . . but empiricism is
readily discarded when more traditional and legally acceptable bases for deci-
sionmaking are available." Bersoff, supra note 52.
184. The district court made 15 findings of fact that it placed under the
heading of "Testimony as to Beneficial Effect." Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 766-70.
The testimony relating to the effects of the notice and bypass scheme came fromjudges who collectively had heard over 90% of the bypass petitions filed in Min-
nesota, ajudge who had heard bypass petitions in Massachusetts, abortion clinic
counselors, public defenders, psychologists, medical doctors and other expert
witnesses. Id. at 766-68. The court found that the witnesses who had extensive
experience working with minors confronting abortion decisions could not iden-
tify any positive effect of the Minnesota law. Id. Although the State of Minne-
sota offered the testimony of two experts as to the beneficial effects of the law,
the court found the testimony of these two experts to be less credible than the
contrary testimony of witnesses with greater qualifications and experience. Id. at
768.
The district court also cited statistics on the incidence of children not living
with both parents and on the problem of domestic violence and made findings
regarding the specific problems inherent in notifying a non-custodial parent. Id
at 768-69. The court found that forced notification of a second parent could be
emotionally and physically harmful, and in some cases could reduce parent-child
communication by discouraging notification of the first parent. Id. at 769.
Finally, the district court made two findings on the effects of the 48-hour
waiting period. Id. at 769-70. The court found that the interest effectuated by
the state's 48-hour waiting period could be effectuated as completely by a
shorter waiting period. Id. at 769.
The Supreme Court was also presented with research suggesting that com-
pelled parental disclosure does not serve to "Foster Productive Intrafamily
Communication;" "Ensure That The Minor's Decision To Obtain An Abortion
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 6 [1991], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/6
the Justices differed markedly in their use of the data. Justices Stevens
and O'Connor made selective use of empirical data. Justice Marshall
examined the data on each aspect of the statute, and Justice Kennedy
did not refer to the data at all.
i. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens framed the issue in Hodgson by stating that the "Min-
nesota statute cannot be sustained if the obstacles it imposes are not
reasonably related to legitimate state interests."18 5 As noted earlier, it
appears that the only state interest that Justice Stevens recognized as
legitimate was the interest in the welfare of the child.' 8 6 Therefore, he
examined how forty-eight hour notice and two-parent notification
served the asserted state interest in the welfare of the child.18 7 Specifi-
cally, he examined whether these obstacles served to promote better
decisionmaking on the part of the minor.188 To answer this question,
Justice Stevens used data on the actual operation of the statute.18 9
First, in examining the constitutionality of the two-parent notice re-
quirement, 190 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in part VII of his
opinion, concluded that the state's interest in ensuring that a minor's
decision to terminate her pregnancy is knowing, intelligent and deliber-
ate is fully served, "[t]o the extent .. legitimate," by the requirement
that the minor notify one parent.' 9 1 He examined the testimony at trial
on the actual operation of the statute and determined that "two-parent
notification fail[s] to serve any state interest with respect to functioning
families ... [and] disserves the state interest in protecting and assisting
the minor with respect to dysfunctional families."' 92 Justice Stevens'
Is A Capable One;" or "Assist Minors In Dealing With The Psychological Seque-
lae Of Abortion." APA Amicus Brief, supra note 117, at 16-29.
185. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2937 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J.). For
discussion of the disagreement as to the appropriate standard, see supra notes
75-97 and accompanying text.
186. Id. at 2946.
187. Id. at 2944 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J.); id. at 2945-47.
188. Id. at 2944 (Stevens,J., joined by O'Connor, J.) (48-hour wait furthers
state interest in ensuring knowing and intelligent decision); id. at 2945-47 (two-
parent notification too broad in furthering same state interest).
189. Id. at 2944 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J.); id. at 2945-47 (Ste-
vens, J., majority opinion).
190. In writing for the Court in part VII of his opinion, Justice Stevens fo-
cused on the difference between two and one-parent notification, id. at 2945-57,
but he did not reexamine one-parent notification requirements in light of the
data. The district court's findings focused on two-parent notice, as opposed to
notice in general. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 768-69 (D. Minn.
1986).
191. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2945. Justice Stevens did not systematically dis-
cuss how one-parent notice might lead to improved decisionmaking. In fact,
there is a sizeable body of empirical evidence that compelled disclosure does not
lead to better decisionmaking. See APA Amicus Brief, supra note 117, at 16-26.
192. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2945. Justice Stevens discussed the negative
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conclusion that two-parent notification did not reasonably further any
legitimate state interest was remarkable given that the standard of re-
view chosen by the Court was one which traditionally entails a high de-
gree of deference to legislative decisions and rarely results in the
invalidation of legislation. 19 3 The overwhelming negative data on two-
parent notification may have been too much for the Court to ignore.
Second, in part VI of his opinion, Justice Stevens inquired as to
whether the forty-eight hour delay requirement furthered the state in-
terest in ensuring that the minor's decision was knowing and intelli-
gent. 194 To support his conclusion that the waiting period reasonably
furthered this interest, he speculated as to how the waiting period might
be used.' 9 5 In addition, in part IV of his opinion, he referred to the
finding of the district court in Hodgson that a mandatory delay served the
state's interest. Justice Stevens also cited evidence, however, that un-
dermined his conclusion. He referred to the district court's finding that
the state's interest could be served by a shorter waiting period, 19 6 and
he cited evidence as to the burdens imposed by the delay
requirement. 19 7
After concluding that the two-parent notification requirement did
not serve legitimate state interests, Justice Stevens examined whether
the judicial bypass provision could save the statute. 198 He concluded
that the statute was unconstitutional even with the judicial bypass proce-
dure, and therefore, this portion of his opinion (part VIII) is a dissent
from the holding of the majority of the court.' 9 9 In reaching this con-
clusion, he did not examine whether the actual operation of the judicial
bypass procedure furthered the state's interest. 20 0 Instead, he looked to
precedent to decide whether the bypass procedure met constitutional
effects of the statutory scheme. Id. For a discussion of the district court's find-
ings on this issue, see supra note 184.
193. For a discussion of the deferential nature of this standard of review,
see supra note 95.
194. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2944 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J.).
195. Id. (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J.) (stating that brief waiting pe-
riod provides parent opportunity to consult with spouse and physician and per-
mits parent to inquire into competency of doctor performing abortion, discuss
religious or moral implications of abortion decision, and provide daughter
needed guidance and counsel in evaluating impact of decision on her future).
196. Id. at 2940-41.
197. Id. at 2940 (waiting period in many cases compounded with other fac-
tors to create delay of week or more and delay of that magnitude increased med-
ical risk of abortion procedure to statistically significant degree). Although the
district court concluded that "[slome period of mandatory delay" would further
the state's interest in protecting pregnant minors, the "reasonableness" of the
48-hour delay was questioned by the district court in light of the fact that a
shorter waiting period would serve the same function. Hodgson v. Minnesota,
648 F. Supp. 756, 769 (D. Minn. 1986).
198. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2947-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
199. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
200. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Justice Stevens did acknowledge
1644 [Vol. 36: p. 1611
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requirements. 20 1 After distinguishing Hodgson from Bellotti and Ashcroft
to support his argument that the Court was not bound by stare deci-
sis, 20 2 he stated that while one-parent consent or notification reasonably
furthered the state interest, two-parent notification did not.20 3 justice
Stevens failed to acknowledge that Hodgson was different from Bellotti
and Ashcroft in that the Hodgson Court had actual data on the operation of
a bypass procedure. 20 4
ii. Justice O'Connor
Although justice O'Connor disagreed with Justice Stevens' conclu-
sions regarding the constitutionality of the statute with the judicial by-
pass procedure, she agreed with Justice Stevens' framing of the issue in
Hodgson: "[The] statute cannot be sustained if the obstacles it imposes
are not reasonably related to legitimate state interests."20 5 LikeJustice
Stevens, she appeared to see the primary state interest served by notice
provisions as the interest in the welfare of the minor and, specifically, in
the minor's informed decisionmaking. 20 6 justice O'Connor concluded
that the requirement of notice to both parents swept too broadly and
failed "to serve the purposes asserted by the State in too many
some of the district court's findings on the actual effect of the judicial bypass
scheme in part IV of his opinion. Id. at 2940.
201. Id. at 2947-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). justice Stevens stated
that "[n]either [Bellotti II nor Ashcroft] should control our decision today." Id. at
2948 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
202. Id. at 2948 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Justice Stevens noted that
Bellotti II held the Massachusetts statute unconstitutional and that the discussion
of the minimum requirements for a valid judicial bypass injustice Powell's opin-
ion was joined by only three other members of the Court. Id. (Stevens, J., dis-
senting in part). He distinguished Ashcroft by noting that it only dealt with a
statute requiring involvement of one parent. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
203. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). justice Stevens stated that one-
parent involvement reasonably furthers the state interest, but he offered no sup-
port for this proposition. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). He opined that
[a] judicial bypass ... designed to handle exceptions from a reasonable
general rule [(one parent notice)] ... is quite different from a require-
ment that a minor-or a minor and one of her parents-must apply to a
court for permission to avoid the application of a rule that is not rea-
sonably related to legitimate state goals.
Id. at 2948-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
204. justice Stevens had said in Betlotti II that the constitutionality of paren-
tal consent statutes with judicial bypass in actual operation was still open. Bellotti
II, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). In Ohio v. Akron Center, he left open the question of
the constitutionality of that statute in actual operation. For a discussion of this
aspect of Ohio v. Akron Center, see infra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
205. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2950 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment in part) (quoting justice Stevens' opinion, id. at 2937 (Ste-
vens, J., joined by Brennan, J.)).
206. Id. at 2949 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment in part) (citing Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 640-41).
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cases," 20 7 but she did not make it clear on what evidence she based the
conclusion that it failed to serve the state's purpose. 208
Justice O'Connor stated that the judicial bypass provision brought
the statute into line with constitutional requirements. 20 9 Her rationale
for approval of the statute with judicial bypass was that "[i]n a series of
cases, this Court has explicitly approved judicial bypass as a means of
tailoring a parental consent provision so as to avoid unduly burdening a
minor's limited right to obtain an abortion." 210 She failed, however, to
examine whether a statute with judicial bypass "rationally relates to a
legitimate state purpose" as applied (for example, by helping minors to
make a knowing, intelligent decision).2 1'
iii. Justice Marshall
In contrast to Justices Stevens and O'Connor, Justice Marshall
closely examined how each aspect of the statute furthered state interests
in actual operation. As noted earlier, Justice Marshall would have ap-
plied a strict scrutiny test to the Minnesota statute.2 12 He stated, how-
ever, that "[f:or the reasons stated by Justice S[tevens] ... Minnesota's
two-parent notification requirement is not even reasonably related to a
legitimate state interest."'213 Justice Marshall made extensive use of
data in examining the extent to which the restrictions were narrowly tai-
lored to serve the state interests. 214 Although Justice Marshall focused
on whether the statute was "narrowly tailored to serve the state inter-
ests" and not whether the statute was "reasonably related to the state
interests," under both standards the Court looks at the degree to which
the statute serves the state interest. The "narrowly tailored" standard
requires an extra step to ensure that the state cannot further its purpose
in a less burdensome way.
Justice Marshall acknowledged that the main purpose asserted for
the notification and delay requirements was "to protect the well-being of
207. Id. at 2950 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment in part).
208. This may be due to the fact that Justice O'Connor was only writing a
concurring opinion.
209. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2950-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment in part).
210. Id. at 2950 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment in part).
211. Justice O'Connor did not refer to the findings of the district court on
the actual operation of the notice/judicial bypass scheme. See id. at 2950-51(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment in part).
212. For a discussion of Justice Marshall's rationale for application of a
strict scrutiny test, see supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
213. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2951 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
214. Id. at 2951-60 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part).
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minors" and, specifically, to help ensure that their decisions were
"knowing and intelligent. ' 2 15 He asserted that he did not need to de-
termine whether the state's interest outweighed the privacy interest be-
cause the strictures were not "closely tailored" to further the state
interest in helping ensure that the minor's decision was "knowing and
intelligent." 2 16 According toJustice Marshall, the notification and delay
requirements of the Minnesota statute were not closely tailored to fur-
ther this interest because: (1) they were superfluous for those minors
who would voluntarily consult, and (2) they were unlikely to result in
productive consultation in families where the daughter was not comfort-
able consulting her parents. 2 17 In fact,Justice Marshall stated that these
requirements were more likely to result in harm in certain "less than
ideal" families. 2 18 As support for these propositions, he cited an article
from a psychology journal and the testimony of two experts.2 19
Justice Marshall also addressed the relationship between the statute
and protection of the parents' limited interest.2 20 He concluded that
the requirements were not narrowly tailored to the state's interest in
facilitating legal exercise of parental authority, 22 1 particularly because
215. Id. at 2955 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part). The notification requirement will purportedly ac-
complish this goal by encouraging discussion, and the 48-hour delay will accom-
plish it by providing time for consultation. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
216. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
217. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part). Presumably, this means that the notification and delay
requirements were not reasonably related to furthering the state interest. Id. at
2951 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part and dis-
senting in part).
218. Id. at 2955 (Marshall,J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
219. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part). In the psychology journal article, the author examined
several findings in existing research from which he concluded that compelled
notification was unlikely to result in helpful discussion. Melton, supra note 164,
at 81 (1987). The author acknowledged, however, that direct evaluations of no-
tice statutes had not been conducted. Id. Justice Marshall also cited the testi-
mony of two experts, Dr. Steven Butzer and Dr. Lenore Walker, that forced
notification was likely to lead to negative effects. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2955
(Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
220. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2956-57 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, con-
curring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). ForJustice Marshall's posi-
tion on this interest, see supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
221. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall focused on whether the statute's re-
quirements were narrowly drawn here, rather than on whether they furthered
the state's interest. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part). He emphasized that they were not tailored to
further a "legitimate" interest. Id at 2957 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, con-
curring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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they facilitated exercise of parental authority even when it might harm
the child and because the parents were given the right to veto the child's
decision in some situations. 22 2
Justice Marshall concluded that the judicial bypass option did not
render the parental notification and forty-eight-hour delay requirements
constitutional because the bypass procedure was "unconstitutional both
on its face and as applied. ' 22 3 The bypass procedure was unconstitu-
tional as applied because it was too burdensome, 2 24 and it did not serve
the asserted state interest. 22 5 According to Justice Marshall, the bypass
procedure did not serve the state's interest in promoting informed deci-
sionmaking on the part of all minors, because first, it was merely a "rub-
ber stamp."' 226 As support for this, he cited the findings of the district
court and a researcher's description of the hearings. 2 2 7 Second, he
pointed out that no positive effects were noted by the judges who testi-
fied in the district court.2 28 Thus, based on his examination of the em-
pirical data presented, Justice Marshall reached the conclusion that this
statutory scheme was not likely to assist the minor in reaching an in-
formed and voluntary decision.2 29
222. Id. at 2956-57 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part).
223. Id. at 2951 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall concluded that the provision was
invalid on its face because it gave a third party, thejudge, an absolute veto. Id.
at 2957 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
224. Id. at 2958-59 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part). For Justice Marshall's discussion of the
burdens created by the bypass procedure, see supra notes 155-66 and accompa-
nying text.
225. Id. at 2959-60 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part). He concluded that the bypass "substan-
tially burdens a woman's right of privacy without advancing a compelling state
interest." Id. at 2951 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
226. Id. at 2959 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part). It was ajudge who had heard many bypass petitions
who referred to the proceedings as a "rubber stamp." Hodgson v. Minnesota,
648 F. Supp. 756, 766 (D. Minn. 1986).
227. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2959 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall cited the find-
ing of the district court that an extremely small number of petitions were denied.
Id. (Marshall,J., concurring in part., concurring in judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part). Nine petitions out of 3,567 that went to decision were denied, and
"anomalous circumstances surrounded several of the petitions that were de-
nied." Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 765 (D. Minn. 1986). Justice
Marshall also cited a psychologist's description of the hearings as merely pro
forma. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2959. (Marshall,J., concurring in part, concurring
in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing Melton, supra note 164, at 80).
228. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2959 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing findings of district court).
229. Id. at (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part
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iv. Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy did not refer to any of the data collected regarding
the statute's ability to further state interests in actual operation. Justice
Kennedy concurred with the portion of the Court's decision upholding
the two-parent notice requirement with judicial bypass, but dissented
from the portion of the Court's judgment holding two-parent notice
without judicial bypass unconstitutional. 23 0 In concluding that the two-
parent notification requirement was valid without a bypass procedure,
he relied on precedent and gave great deference to the legislature. 23 1
Justice Kennedy neither evaluated whether the state's interest in the wel-
fare of pregnant minors was actually served by notification,2 32 nor ex-
amined whether the state's interest in the protection of the right of each
parent to participate in the upbringing of her or his own children was
actually served by notification. 23 3 In reaching the conclusion that Min-
nesota's judicial bypass scheme was constitutional, Justice Kennedy re-
lied solely on precedent and a facial analysis of the statute. In stark
contrast to Justice Marshall, he did not address the substantial empirical
data on the actual operation of the bypass procedure. 23 4
2. The Ohio Statute
The Ohio statute at issue in Ohio v. Akron Center presented the Court
with a challenge different from that presented in Hodgson. The Ohio
statute included more extensive requirements than those that had been
addressed in prior cases.23 5 In addition, this statute had not yet been
and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall raised the possibility that statutory
schemes providing for counseling might be more likely to achieve the state's
purpose of informed decisionmaking. Id. at 2959 & n.9 (Marshall,J., concurring
in part, concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (discussing Maine
statute which provides option for receiving counseling according to specified
criteria and Wisconsin statute under which abortion providers are to encourage
notification of "another family member, close family friend, school counselor,
social worker or other appropriate person" when minor has valid reason for not
notifying parents).
230. Id. at 2961 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part).
231. Id. at 2965-69 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-
senting in part). Justice Kennedy took it as a "well-accepted premise that [the
Court] must defer to a reasonable judgment by the state legislature when it de-
termines what is sound public policy." Id. at 2966 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
232. Justice Kennedy's approach contrasts with the approach taken by Jus-
tice Marshall, supra notes 215-29 and accompanying text, and the findings of the
district court, supra note 184.
233. See Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2961-72 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part).
234. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (Justice Kennedy made no reference to factual findings of district court).
235. For a discussion of these additional requirements, see supra notes 63-
65 and accompanying text.
19911 NOTE 1649
39
Anderer: Getting the Facts: Empirical Evaluation and the Constitutionality
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
put into operation. 236 A detailed analysis of Ohio v. Akron Center is be-
yond the scope of this Note, but it is instructive to examine those aspects
of the opinion that indicate the receptiveness of the Court to constitu-
tional challenges to abortion statutes, particularly challenges based on
empirical data. Although the analyses of Justices Stevens and Kennedy
focused on how the Ohio statute fit with precedent, both Justices ex-
pressly left open the possibility that the statute could be challenged on
the basis of its actual operation.
a. Legitimate State Purposes or Interests
In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy did not engage in much
discussion about the legitimacy of the Ohio legislature's purposes for
enacting H.B. 319.237 Justice Blackmun, however, concluded in his dis-
sent that "[t]he challenged provisions of the Ohio statute were merely
'poorly disguised elements of discouragement for the abortion deci-
sion.' ",238 With regard to the pleading requirements, Justice Blackmun
stated that "[tihe majority fails to elucidate any state interest in setting
up this barricade for the young pregnant woman."' 239 He dismissed the
justification that the state put forward before the court of appeals as
"absurd" 240 and said that "[t]he State's interest in 'streamlining' the
claims, belatedly asserted for the first time before this Court, is no less
absurd.",24 1
236. The statute had not been put into operation because the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio issued an injunction preventing
the statute's enforcement. For a discussion of the procedural posture of Ohio v.
Akron Center, see supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
237. See Ohio v. Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2977-84. Presumably, much of
Justice Kennedy's discussion in Hodgson on this point would be relevant here as
well. For a discussion ofJustice Kennedy's views on legitimate state purposes or
interests, as expressed in Hodgson, see supra notes 112-44.
238. Ohio v. Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2985 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 763 (1986)). At another point, Justice Blackmun stated: "The
Ohio Legislature, in its wisdom, in 1985 enacted its anti-abortion statute." Id. at
2992 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In concluding, he said: "The underlying na-
ture of the Ohio statute is proclaimed by its strident and offensively restrictive
provisions. It is as though the Legislature said: 'If the courts of the United
States insist on upholding a limited right to abortion, let us make [it] as difficult
as possible to obtain ..... Id. at 2993 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Discourage-
ment of the decision to abort is presumably still an illegitimate state purpose, at
least in the first trimester of pregnancy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64
(1973).
239. Ohio v. Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2986 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 2986 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The justification the State put
forward before the Court of Appeals was the 'absurd contention that "[a]ny mi-
nor claiming to be mature and well enough informed to independently make
such an important decision as an abortion should also be mature enough to file
her complaint under [the appropriate subsection]." (quoting Ohio v. Akron
Center, 854 F.2d at 863)).
241. Id. at 2986 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
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Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, did consider the legitimacy
of the state's reasons for enacting one particular provision of the Ohio
statute-the physician notification requirement. Appellees contended
that "Ohio ha[d] no reason for requiring the minor's physician, rather
than some other qualified person, to notify one of the minor's par-
ents." 24 2 Justice Kennedy distinguished the statutory requirement that
the treating physician notify the minor's parent from the physician coun-
seling requirement held invalid in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health SerVices.24 3 He then stated that the physician notification
provision was justified "because the parent often will provide important
medical data to the physician" and because "[t]he conversation with the
physician . . . may enable a parent to provide better advice to the
minor." 24 4
The physician notification provision caused Justice Stevens, in his
concurrence, to raise the possibility that the legislature's purpose was
actually to discourage abortion rather than to foster informed decision-
making. 245 Justice Blackmun asserted that this was indeed the purpose
of the Ohio legislature. 246 He noted that the State did not "claim[] that
personal notice by the physician was required to effectuate an interest in
the minor's health until the matter reached this Court," and he there-
fore characterized the state's concern for the health of the minor as
"chimerical." 2 47
242. Id. at 2983.
243. Id. In Akron v. Akron Center, the Court held invalid an ordinance requir-
ing the attending physician to personally counsel the abortion patient. City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 446-49 (1983).
Justice Kennedy distinguished the requirement in Ohio v. Akron Center that the
physician notify the parent by asserting that "although counselors may provide
information about general risks as in Akron [v. Akron Center]," physicians have a
superior ability "to garner and use information supplied by a minor's parents
upon receiving notice." Ohio v. Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2983. In addition, he
stated that the "conversation with the physician ... may enable a parent to pro-
vide better advice to the minor." Id.
244. Ohio v. Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2983.
245. Id. at 2995 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment) ("One cannot overlook the possibility that this provision was motivated
more by a legislative interest in placing obstacles in the woman's path... than
by a genuine interest in fostering informed decisionmaking."). As noted earlier,
discouragement of the decision to abort is presumably still an illegitimate state
purpose, at least in the first trimester of pregnancy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 162-64 (1973).
246. Ohio v. Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2991 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("[T]here is more than a 'possibility' that the physician-notification provision
'was motivated more by a legislative interest in placing obstacles in the woman's
path to an abortion ... than by a genuine interest in fostering informed deci-
sionmaking.' " (quoting Id. at 2995 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment)).
247. Id. at 2991-92 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun then pro-
ceeded to refute the idea that health concerns could have been the motivation
behind the legislation. Id. at 2992 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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b. The Burden
Justices Stevens and Kennedy differed markedly from Justice Black-
mun in their conclusions regarding the burdens posed by the various
provisions of the Ohio statute. Because these provisions had not been
put into operation, the Justices were forced to speculate as to the impact
the provisions would have. Although Justices Stevens and Kennedy con-
cluded that the statute did not pose unconstitutional burdens on its face,
they left open the possibility that a later challenge could be made based
on the operation of the statute.
Justice Kennedy, in part V of his opinion, concluded that the "Ohio
statute . . . does not impose an undue, or otherwise unconstitutional
burden on a minor seeking an abortion." 248 Writing for the Court, he
relied primarily on precedent in determining that the Ohio statute was
constitutional, stating that "[w]e do not need to determine whether a
statute that does not accord with these cases would violate the Constitu-
tion, for we conclude that H.B. 319 is consistent with them."1249 He ex-
amined each provision, one at a time, and either declared that it was
consistent with precedent or that it did not pose unconstitutional
burdens.250
In dissent, Justice Blackmun reached a conclusion that Justice Ken-
nedy refused to reach:251 He stated that a notice statute, like a consent
statute, must contain a bypass procedure that comports with the stan-
dards set forth in Bellotti 11.252 Justice Blackmun disagreed with Justice
248. Id. at 2983 (Kennedy, J.,joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices
White and Scalia).
249. Id. at 2978.
250. Justice Kennedy held that the provisions for confidentiality and ano-
nymity in the Ohio statute were sufficient to meet the Bellotti I anonymity re-
quirement. Id. at 2980. The Ohio complaint forms did require the minor to
disclose her identity, butJustice Kennedy stated that "[w]e refuse to base a deci-
sion on the facial validity of a statute on the mere possibility of an unauthorized,
illegal disclosure by state employees." Id. Similarly, he stated that the Ohio
statute met the requirement of expediency laid down in Bellotti 11 because in
"making a facial challenge to a statute, [appellees] must show that 'no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.'" Id. at 2980-81
(quoting Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 524 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). He further
stated that the "Court of Appeals should not have invalidated the Ohio statute
... based upon a worst-case analysis that may never occur." Id. at 2981. Justice
Kennedy asserted that Ohio was not required to provide for constructive author-
ization in the event of judicial delay and that this provision merely served as a
safety net. Id. He also dismissed the burdens posed by the clear and convincing
evidence standard, the pleading requirements and the physician notification re-
quirement as not constitutionally infirm. Id. at 2981-83.
251. Justice Kennedy explicitly .left open the question of whether the
"Fourteenth Amendment requires notice statutes to contain bypass procedures"
because the Ohio statute "meets the requirements identified for parental con-
sent statutes in Danforth, Bellotti, Ashcroft and Akron [ v. Akron Center]." Id. at 2979.
252. Id. at 2985 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Kennedy that the Ohio bypass procedure complied with the dictates of
Bellotti II and its progeny.253 In this regard, he stated that "[t]he major-
ity consider[ed] each provision in a piecemeal fashion, never acknowl-
edging or assessing the 'degree of burden that the entire regime of
abortion regulations places' on the minor." 254
Although Justices Stevens and Kennedy concluded that the provi-
sions of H.B. 319 did not present unconstitutional burdens, they both
emphasized in Ohio v. Akron Center that the Court was making a facial
analysis of the statute.255 Thus, they left open the possibility of a chal-
253. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
254. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Dellinger & Sperling, Abortion
and the Supreme Court: Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 83, 100
(1989)). Justice Blackmun referred to the Ohio statutory framework as a "tortu-
ous maze," an "obstacle course," and a "labyrinth." Id. at 2985-86 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). He expressed concern that the pleading requirements would
"prevent[] some minors from showing either that they are mature or that an
abortion would be in their best interests" and that the identification requirement
would make a woman "more reluctant to choose an abortion." Id at 2986, 2987
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obste-
tricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 766 (1989)). Justice Blackmun also re-
ferred to the increased medical risks associated with the delays allowed by the
Ohio statute. Id. at 2988 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). He stated that the" 'practi-
cal effect' of the [constructive authorization] provision is to frustrate the minor's
right to an expedient disposition of her petition." Id. at 2989 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Ohio, 854 F.2d
852, 868 (6th Cir. 1988)). Justice Blackmun asserted that "(tihe imposition of
[the] heightened standard of proof unduly burdens the minor's right to seek an
abortion." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun also concluded that "[t]he strictures of this Ohio law...
impinge on the physician's professional discretion in the practice of medicine."
Id. at 2992 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). He emphasized the
physician's right in his majority opinion in Roe v. Wade as well. Roe, 410 U.S.
113, 123 (1973) ("this decision vindicateg the right of the physician to adminis-
ter medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the point
where state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention").
255. For example, in addressing the confidentiality provisions,Justice Ken-
nedy stated that "[w]e refuse to base a decision on the facial validity of a statute
on the mere possibility of unauthorized, illegal disclosure by state employees."
Ohio v. Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2980 (emphasis added). In addressing the
expedition requirement, he stated that "because appellees are making a facial
challenge to a statute, they must show that 'no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid.'" Id. at 2980-81 (quoting Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 524 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment)) (emphasis added). He further stated that
"[r]egardless of whether Ohio could have written a simpler statute, H.B. 319
survives afacial challenge." Id. at 2982 (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy con-
cluded that "[t]he confidentiality provisions, the expedited procedures, and the
pleading form requirements, on their face, satisfy the dictates of minimal due
process." Id. (emphasis added). With regard to the physician notification re-
quirement, he held that "[o]n thisfacial challenge, we find [it] unobjectionable."
Id. at 2983 (emphasis added).
Justice Stevens also stressed that "appellees have challenged the Ohio stat-
ute only on itsface." Id. at 2993 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment) (emphasis added). He stated elsewhere that "[t]he Ohio statute,
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lenge to the Ohio statute "as applied."'25 6 It is surprising that Justice
Kennedy emphasized the facial nature of the challenge to the Ohio stat-
ute and seemed to leave open the possibility of a challenge to the statute
as applied, because in Hodgson, when faced with a challenge "in opera-
tion" or "as applied," he failed to acknowledge that fact.25 7 Rather, Jus-
tice Kennedy conducted a facial analysis in Hodgson, while ignoring
substantial empirical data relating to the statute's operation. 258
c. Relationship between the Statute and the State's Interest
Speculation dominated the discussion over whether the Ohio stat-
ute would further the interests of the state. Justices Kennedy and Black-
mun reached different conclusions from this speculation. Justice
Stevens indicated that his conclusion, finding the statute constitutional,
was tentative, because as implemented, the statute might be
unconstitutional.
Justice Kennedy did not discuss how the lack of anonymity in the
Ohio statute's confidentiality provisions furthered any state interest nor
did he discuss how the extended time available to the Ohio courts by the
expedited procedure provisions furthered a state interest. He simply
concluded that these provisions were not outside the scope of the re-
quirements of Bellotti I1.259 Similarly, he did not discuss what interest
was served by the pleading requirements, describing them as "simple
and straightforward. '26 0 Justice Kennedy speculated as to the beneficial
on itsface, provides a sufficient procedure for those cases" in which a minor is
mature or parental notice is not in her best interest, and that he was "unable to
conclude that [the physician notification] provision is unconstitutional on its
face." Id. at 2994-95 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment) (emphasis added).
256. Justice Kennedy's opinion implies that if plaintiffs can show actual
"unauthorized, illegal disclosure by state employees," that a "worst-case" scena-
rio actually occurred or that "time limitations imposed by H.B. 319 will be ig-
nored," they may have grounds for invalidating the statute. See id. at 2980-81.
Justice Stevens expressly left open the possibility that the statute may be uncon-
stitutional as "implemented," but he stated that he was unwilling to reach the
conclusion that the statute should be invalidated "before the statute has been
implemented and the significance of its restrictions evaluated in light of its ad-
ministration." Id. at 2993 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). Justice Stevens made a similar point in Bellotti II, stating that in ac-
tual application, state regulations requiring parental consent or notification cou-
pled with ajudicial bypass procedure could create undue and unforseen burdens
on a minor that the Court failed to anticipate. Bellotti I, 443 U.S. 622, 634
(1979).
257. For a discussion of Justice Kennedy's failure to acknowledge the evi-
dence on the actual operation of the statute at issue in Hodgson, see supra notes
154-156 & 215-219 and accompanying text.
258. For a discussion of Justice Kennedy's analysis in Hodgson, see supra
notes 167-69 & 230-34 and accompanying text.
259. Ohio v. Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2979-81.
260. Id. at 2982. But see id. at 2985, 2986 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(describing pleading requirements as a "pleading trap" and a "barricade").
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effects of other aspects of the statute.261
Justice Blackmun systematically examined the state interests that
were served by each of the provisions of the Ohio statute and came to
the conclusion that the statute did not further state interests in light of
the burdens it imposed on the pregnant minor.262 Justice Blackmun ex-
pressed dismay that no reasons had been advanced for certain provi-
sions of the Ohio statute and expressed concern about the real world
effects of other provisions. 263
The contrasting conclusions reached by Justices Blackmun and
Kennedy as a result of their speculation demonstrate the need for data
on which to base a decision. Justice Stevens expressed receptiveness to
data as to the actual impact of the Ohio statute. He asserted that "the
State may presume that, in most of its applications, the statute will rea-
sonably further its legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of its mi-
nor citizens.' '264 He left open the possibility, however, that once the
261. Justice Kennedy stated that the constructive authorization provision
was added "[w]ith an abundance of caution, and concern for the minor's inter-
ests .... to ensure expedition of the bypass procedures even if [the] time limits
are not met." Id. at 2981. He stated that the clear and convincing evidence
standard "ensures that the judge will take special care in deciding whether the
minor's consent to an abortion should proceed without parental notification."
Id at 2982. Finally, he asserted that the physician notification provision served a
state interest "because the parent often will provide important medical data to
the physician" and because "[t]he conversation with the physician . . . may en-
able a parent to provide better advice to the minor." Id. at 2983. He did not
discuss why these interests could not be furthered by a discussion with persons
other than the physician.
262. Id. at 2985 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
263. Justice Blackmun concluded that the majority failed to elucidate any
state interest that was served by the pleading requirements. Id. at 2986 (Black-
mun,J., dissenting). He asserted that "[t]he State has offered no justification for
its failure to provide specific guidelines to be followed by the Juvenile Court to
ensure anonymity for the pregnant minor." Id. at 2987 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Blackmun stated that although the constructive authorization pro-
vision may have been intended to expedite the bypass procedure, its practical
effect was to frustrate expedient disposition of the procedure, and "the State
offer[ed] no reason why a formal order or some kind of actual notification from
the clerk of court would not be possible." Id. at 2989 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
He asserted that the clear and convincing evidence standard "does little to facili-
tate a fair and reliable result." Id. at 2990 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun expressed particular concern about the effect that the
heightened standard of proof would have in dysfunctional families. Id. at 2990-
91 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He also expressed skepticism about the state's
asserted justification for the physician notification provision. Id. at 2991-92
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("If these chimerical health concerns now asserted in
fact were the true motivation behind this provision, I seriously doubt that the
State would have taken so long to say so."). He believed the state's asserted
interest could be served by conversation with the physician after "notification by
some other competent professional, such as a nurse or counselor." Id. at 2992
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 2993 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
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statute was implemented it could be shown that the statute failed to fur-
ther the state's interest in enough cases, or to a great enough degree in
the exceptional case, that the statute should be invalidated. 26 5 Thus, he
seemed to invite a challenge to the statute "as applied."
Two ominous signs in the Ohio v. Akron Center opinions, however,
suggest that the Court will not be receptive to empirical data in this con-
text. First, Justice Scalia reiterated his position that there is no constitu-
tional right to an abortion and that this is a question for the
legislature.2 66 Second, in section V of his opinion, which was joined by
three otherJustices, 2 67 justice Kennedy stated that the Ohio statute was
a rational means of furthering the end of providing minors with "a
clearer, more tolerant understanding of the profound philosophic
choices confronted by a woman who is considering whether to seek an
abortion. '26 8 This statement suggests that the fourJustices view issues
surrounding the abortion controversy as resting on a plane that is above
empirical refutation. In addition, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Hodgson
reflected an unwillingness to acknowledge empirical data.2 6 9
IV. PROPOSAL FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Hodgson marks a return to the tradition
of classical jurisprudence. 270 He appears to adhere to "the theory that
constitutional questions can be decided by merely holding the words of
the statute up against the applicable constitutional provision."'2 7' The
importance of social sciences and the empirical world to the understand-
265. Id. at 2993 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
266. Id. at 2984 (Scalia, J, concurring). Justice Scalia also agreed with the
majority that the statute did not deprive minors of procedural due process nor
contradict prior holdings. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
267. ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scaliajoined injustice
Kennedy's opinion.
268. Ohio v. Akron Center, 110 S. Ct. at 2983 (Kennedy, J., joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia). This section of justice Ken-
nedy's opinion provoked a heated response from Justice Blackmun. Id. at 2993(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("hyperbole [in Part V ofJustice Kennedy's opinion]
can have but one result: to further incite [] American press, public, and pulpit").
269. For a discussion of Justice Kennedy's failure to acknowledge the evi-
dence on the actual operation of the statute at issue in Hodgson, see supra notes
154-156 & 215-219 and accompanying text.
270. Classical jurisprudence has been defined as:
[T]he belief that a single, correct legal solution could be reached in
every case by the application of logic to a set of natural, self-evident
principles. Classical jurisprudence understood the process of deciding
cases to be purely rational and exclusively deductive and thus produced
a formal mechanical approach to decisionmaking.
Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social
Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 479 (1986) (footnote omitted).
271. Pine, supra note 33, at 665 n.34 (quoting Alflange, The Relevance of Leg-
islative Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. Rv. 637, 642 (1966)).
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46
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 6 [1991], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/6
ing and evolution of law, however, is today a point of general agreement
and should not be ignored. 2 72 Justice Marshall's approach is more con-
sistent with this modern view. He "weigh[s] means against ends, bur-
dens against benefits, and asserted state interests against [the] law's
actual achievements in the course of determining constitutional valid-
ity."'2 73 Justice Marshall's approach is particularly appropriate in cases
such as Hodgson where the issues addressed are susceptible to empirical
evaluation. An approach to reviewing legislation regulating the abor-
tion decisions of minors that takes into account empirical evidence is
advocated below.
A. Minor's Interest and Standard of Review
The initial question that must be answered by the Court in review-
ing legislation regulating the abortion decisions of minors is what de-
gree of protection from state interference these decisions should
receive. As noted earlier, the Court is divided as to the appropriate
standard of review to apply to a statute regulating a minor's abortion
decision.274 In the Hodgson decision, it appeared that a majority of the
Court would at least require that the state regulation be reasonably re-
lated to a legitimate state purpose. 2 75 Although it was not clear from
the opinions, it may be that if a regulation "unduly burdens" the minor's
decision, a heightened standard of scrutiny will apply.2 7 6 Thus, in re-
272. It is commonly accepted today that law should be informed by empiri-
cal fact. Monahan & Walker, supra note 270, at 477 ("Once heretical, the belief
that empirical studies can influence the content of legal doctrine is now one of
the few points of general agreement among jurists."). Professors Monahan and
Walker state that all nine justices that were on the Supreme Court in 1986 had
either authored or joined an opinion using social science research to establish or
criticize a rule of law. Id at 477 n.2. Another commentator states that "[t]he
Supreme Court in Brown [v. Board of Education] ... made [it] clear that new facts
and extralegal social-scientific evidence could contribute to judicial alteration or
even reversal of a constitutional rule of law." Pine, supra note 33, at 669. But cf
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168 (1986) ("We will assume for purposes of
this opinion that the studies are both methodologically valid and adequate to
establish that 'death qualification' in fact produces juries somewhat more 'con-
viction-prone' than 'non-death-qualified' juries. We hold, nonetheless, that the
Constitution does not prohibit the States from 'death qualifying' juries in capital
cases.").
273. Pine, supra note 33, at 665. For a detailed discussion of the historical
roots of Justice Marshall's and Justice Kennedy's approaches, see Pine, supra
note 33, at 658-68.
274. For a discussion of the different standards of review proposed in Hodg-
son and Ohio v. Akron Center, see supra notes 75-97 and accompanying text.
275. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2945. This standard was used in declaring un-
constitutional the portion of the Minnesota statute requiring notice to both par-
ents of the pregnant minor without providing for a judicial bypass. Id.
276. Justice O'Connor has advocated a heightened standard of scrutiny
where the statute unduly burdens the abortion decision, and Justices Marshall
and Blackmun, joined in their opinions by Justice Brennan, have advocated
heightened scrutiny in all cases. See supra notes 77-81 & 87-93.
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viewing a parental notification or consent statute, the Court would need
to address three questions: (1) the importance and legitimacy of the
state's interests, (2) the degree to which the means chosen would further
those interests, and (3) the degree to which the means chosen would
burden those seeking to exercise a constitutional right and would bur-
den others.277
Empirical data can assist the Court in answering each of these three
questions. In examining the extent to which the regulation furthers a
state interest, however, the Court has adopted the very deferential ra-
tional relationship standard.2 78 Traditionally, if the rational relation-
ship test applies, then the Court will defer to the legislature and uphold
the regulation. 279 In Hodgson, however, the Court overturned a part of
Minnesota's statutory scheme despite applying this very deferential stan-
dard.2 8 0 The Court appeared to rely on the substantial evidence that
had been accumulated regarding, the positive and negative effects of
two-parent notification in holding that such a notification requirement
was unconstitutional without a judicial bypass alternative.2 8' This deci-
sion is thus one of a handful in which the court has overturned legisla-
tion while applying the most deferential standard of review. 28 2
It is proposed that when the Court applies a rational basis test, and
substantial empirical evidence has accumulated as to the statute's ability
to further the state's interest, the test should be a rational basis test
"with bite." 28 3 Legislation should be overturned when there is substan-
tial empirical evidence to suggest that the statute at issue does not fur-
ther the state interest. It has been suggested that the courts have in fact
Given the current composition of the Court, with Justices Souter and
Thomas having replaced Justices Brennan and Marshall, it is difficult to predict
what standard of review will be adopted by a majority of the Court. In a recent
decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that
Justice O'Connor's two-part standard was the standard for lower federal courts
to apply when reviewing abortion legislation. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947
F.2d 682, 691-98 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3498 (1992). For a
discussion of Justice O'Connor's two-part standard, see supra notes 87-93 and
accompanying text.
277. For a discussion of why these were the three questions to be answered
by the Court in Hodgson, see supra note 104 and accompanying text.
278. As noted earlier, the terms "reasonable" and "rational" are generally
used interchangeably. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
279. Turkington, supra note 95, at 1310 ("Practitioners versed in constitu-
tional law know they must bring their case out from under the rational basis test
if they are to be successful in challenging legislation under the due process or
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.").
280. For a discussion of the deferential nature of this standard, see supra
note 95 and accompanying text.
281. For a discussion of the Court's reliance on this evidence, see supra
notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
282. See Turkington, supra note 95, at 1310 n.33.
283. For a description of what is meant by "with bite," see supra note 96
and accompanying text.
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applied such a "rational basis test with bite" in public health cases where
there is substantial medical evidence. 284 The legislation here is similar
to public health legislation in that it purportedly helps to ensure in-
formed decisions and to protect the emotional health of "peculiarly vul-
nerable" minors. Moreover, the empirical evidence available in Hodgson
is analogous to the medical evidence available in public health cases.
In addition to using empirical evidence in assessing the degree to
which a statute furthers the state's interest, the Court should make use
of relevant empirical evidence in assessing the legitimacy of the state's
purpose and in assessing the burdens of the statute.
B. Legitimate State Purpose
In Hodgson, all members of the Court took for granted certain as-
sumptions related to the importance and legitimacy of the state's inter-
est. The main interest that was addressed was the state interest in the
welfare of the pregnant minor. All members of the Court assumed
either that minors are not as capable as adults in decisionmaking with
regard to abortion or are more vulnerable than adults to psychological
harm as a result of abortion decisions.2 85 These assumptions have been
challenged,2 86 and the Court should acknowledge these challenges.
When a legislature enacts a right-infringing law to address a problem
that research suggests does not exist, the Court should question the leg-
islature's purpose. As Professor Tribe has stated:
[T]he requirement that legislation be rationally related to a le-
gitimate governmental purpose.., can serve as little more than
a source of pressure on government to articulate purposes that
fit a challenged law, unless substantive principles are put forth
to exclude from consideration (1) purposes manufactured with
the benefit of hindsight but not in fact motivating a challenged
provision; and ... (2) purposes deemed illegitimate in the con-
text of the provision being challenged.2 8 7
Empirical research can provide substantive grounds for evaluating
the purposes articulated by legislators. If a purpose such as discourage-
ment of the abortion decision is deemed illegitimate, then a statute that
research suggests will do nothing more than that should be overturned.
In addition, when the legislature puts extensive burdens in front of the
284. Burriss, Rationality Review and the Politics of Public Health, 34 VILL L.
REV. 933, 937-42 (1989).
285. For a discussion of the Justices' assumptions about minors' decision-
making capacities and psychological vulnerability, see supra notes 112-20 and
accompanying text.
286. For a discussion of the empirical evidence regarding minors' decision-
making capacities and psychological vulnerability, see supra notes 117-18 and
accompanying text; see also Pine, supra note 33, at 677-93.
287. L. TRIBE, supra note 94, § 15-2. at 1306 (footnotes omitted).
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minor, or when the legislature continues to promote regulations that
have been demonstrated not to serve the asserted purpose, the Court
should question whether the asserted purpose is merely a pretext for an
illegitimate purpose.
The Court also needs to articulate more precisely the interests of
parents in minors' decisionmaking and the extent to which legislatures
may intervene to promote those interests. The Hodgson decision pro-
duced divergent analyses of the relative interests of minors, their par-
ents and the state.28 8 Justice Kennedy's analysis was troubling in that it
gave very little recognition to the status of children as persons apart
from their parents. 289 In addition, the various opinions in Hodgson re-
flected the Court's tendency to refer to a series of prior cases as reflect-
ing a general interest in "family privacy" without considering whether
those decisions involved state-parent conflicts or parent-child con-
flicts. 29 0 The Court needs to determine more precisely the contours of
the family's privacy right; family privacy should not be used as a ration-
ale for denying competent children basic rights of self-determination.
Certainly the right to family privacy should not serve as a basis for state
intervention as suggested by Justice Kennedy. 29'
C. The Burden
The nature of the burden of a law is a question of fact.2 92 When
presented with a facial challenge to a statute, the Court by necessity
must speculate as to the burdens the statute might present. Thus, the
Court in Bellotti II speculated that the judicial bypass framework would
not present "undue burdens" to minors seeking abortions without pa-
rental consent.2 93 When a statute has been put into effect, however,
288. For a discussion of these divergent analyses, see supra notes 121-47.
289. For a discussion ofJustice Kennedy's view on the interests of parents
that are implicated by notification statutes, see supra notes 129-32 & 142 and
accompanying text.
290. Wardle, Parent's Rights vs. Minors' Rights Regarding the Provision of Contra-
ceptives to Teenagers, 68 NEB. L. REV. 216, 227 (1989).
291. For a discussion ofJustice Kennedy's views on the interests of the par-
ents and the family, see supra notes 129-32 & 144 and accompanying text.
292. Questions of burden and benefit are questions of fact. Pine, supra note
33, at 698.
If (a judge] does not hear testimony or receive memoranda illuminating
these questions, he assumes their answers on the basis of his own expe-
rience and education. Thus a judge may make assumptions far beyond
the ordinary range of judicial notice ... [s]uch assumptions may be
correct or incorrect, enlightened or unenlightened, but they are always
made.
Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 75, 84. Cf
Monahan & Walker, supra note 270, at 516 (arguing that social or legislative facts
should, for some purposes, be treated by courts as authority akin to law).
293. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 646-48 (1979). But see id. at 655-56 (Ste-
vensJ., concurring in judgment) ("The need to commence judicial proceedings
in order to obtain a legal abortion would impose a burden at least as great as,
1660 [Vol. 36: p. 1611
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evidence accumulates as to its actual burdens. It is no longer necessary
to rely on assumptions, and the Court's refusal to examine empirical
evidence is tantamount to putting on a blindfold in the face of a poten-
tial infringement of constitutional rights. Even where a statute has not
yet been put into operation, the Court should inform its speculation as
to the burdens the statute will present through reference to experience
with similar statutes and reference to research literature. In Hodgson,
substantial evidence existed regarding the burdens created by Minne-
sota's statutory scheme 294-evidence that Justice Stevens largely ig-
nored and Justice Kennedy ignored completely. 295 Yet,Justices Stevens'
and Kennedy did express an openness to as applied challenges in Ohio v.
Akron Center; it is to be hoped that this receptiveness to empirical data is
not an illusion.
D. The Relationship Between the Statute and the State's Interest
When a Court is faced with a facial challenge to a statute, it must
speculate as to the degree to which that statute will further the state's
interest, much as the Court must speculate as to the burden of a statute.
Again, any such speculation should be informed by reference to relevant
empirical data. In Hodgson, however, the Court was not forced to specu-
late, because it was presented with substantial evidence relating to the
statute's furtherance of the state's interest.296 There was no evidence
that the statute served the state's interest, and substantial evidence sug-
gested that the statute disserved the state interest.297 The district court
was led to the contradictory conclusion that although as a matter of fact
the state law served no purpose, as a matter of law, it did serve a legiti-
mate state purpose.298 Such contradictions between law and fact can do
and probably greater than, that imposed on the minor child b, the need to ob-
tain the consent of a parent." (footnote omitted)).
294. For a discussion of the evidence relating to the burdens created by
Minnesota's statutory scheme, see supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
295. For a discussion of the consideration that Justices Stevens and Ken-
nedy gave to the evidence on the burdens of the Minnesota statute, see supra
notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
296. For a discussion of the evidence relating to the statute's furtherance of
the state's interest that was presented to the Hodgson Court, see supra note 184
and accompanying text.
297. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 765 (D. Minn. 1986).
298. The district court found "as a matter of fact that (the statute] fails to
serve the State's asserted interest in fostering intra-family communication and
protecting pregnant minors." Id. at 775. Nonetheless, the court felt that as a
matter of law the notification and bypass requirements were constitutional be-
cause they met the standards contained in prior cases decided by the Supreme
Court. Id. at 776-77. The district court felt bound by the Supreme Court's prior
decisions even though the facts before it were facts that were not available to the
Supreme Court when it rendered those decisions. For a more extensive discus-
sion of the problem facing district courts when they are presented with facts
contradicting the assumptions of a higher court that had established a standard
of constitutionality, see Pine, supra note 33, at 668-670.
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much to undermine the faith of the public in the law. When there is
direct evidence as to the effect of the law, the Court should attend to
that evidence. Where a statute's ability to further a state interest can be
empirically determined, the Court should put teeth into the rational ba-
sis test.29 9
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, an empirical approach to constitutional adjudication in the
abortion area involves examination of legislative facts relating to the
problem that the state purports to address with its potentially rights-
infringing legislation to determine whether the state's purpose is legiti-
mate, whether the burdens the statute presents are undue, and whether
the statute furthers the state purpose. If the statute has not yet been put
into operation, the Court should make an informed speculation based on
the existing relevant data. If sufficient relevant data to invalidate the
statute do not yet exist, the Court should state this. Once the statute has
been put into operation, the Court should examine the accumulated
data relating to the burden of the legislation and the degree to which the
legislation furthers the state interest.
Although a number of barriers to judicial use of empirical data ex-
ist, these barriers are not insurmountable.3 0 0 What is needed is a firm
resolve to address these barriers. In addition, legislatures should make
use of available data and collect new data that will inform the drafting of
laws.-Y° In this way, legislation may more effectively and sensitively ad-
dress social problems. Legislatures should also attempt to monitor the
actual effect of their laws. Researchers should continue their efforts to
inform both courts and legislatures and should serve as advocates for
empirical truth.
Abortion law is an area where irrationality dominates both sides of
the debate,3 0 2 thus preventing effective compromise. As one commen-
tator has stated about the compromises attempted by legislatures:
299. For a discussion of a rational basis test with teeth, see supra notes 283-
84 and accompanying text.
300. For example, professors Monahan and Walker make specific proposals
for obtaining, evaluating and establishing, in court, the findings of empirical re-
search. Monahan & Walker, supra note 270, at 495-516.
301. Unfortunately, recent large scale efforts to collect information about
adult and adolescent sexual behavior were scuttled by the United States Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services and the United States Congress. Young-
strom, Sex Behavior Studies Are Derailed, APA Monitor, Nov., 1991, at 1, col. 1; see
also Benac, Sullivan Terminates $18 Million Survey on Teens' Sex Habits, Phila. In-
quirer, July 24, 1991, at A5, col. 5 (discussing reasons why Health and Human
Services Secretary cancelled study on adolescent sexual behavior). These stud-
ies could have been useful in developing public policy approaches to problems
such as teenage pregnancy and AIDS. Youngstrom, supra, at 1.
302. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 89 (discussing problems generated by
extreme views on either side of abortion debate).
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The overarching problem with all these purported com-
promises is that they are not compromises at all. Many of the
laws put forward to stake out what is supposedly a middle
ground in the abortion debate, rather than meaningfully pro-
tecting either life or choice, randomly frustrate both and do not
move us closer to a society of caring, responsible people.3 0 3
Counseling has been suggested by a number of commentators as a pos-
sible part of a sensible compromise-one that might effectively further
informed decisionmaking and prevent negative psychological seque-
lae.30 4 Some state legislatures have made counseling part of their statu-
tory schemes.3 0 5 One goal that should be acceptable to all parties is
taking steps toward the prevention of unwanted pregnancies.3 0 6
Whatever measures are undertaken, they should be undertaken with our
eyes open to the real world effects of those measures.
StephenJ. Anderer
303. Id. at 208.
304. See, e.g., Melton & Pliner, supra note 25, at 29 ("Outcome research on
counseling of minors about abortion decisions is limited [but] (t]here is some
evidence that counseling lessens negative emotional effects and promotes a
sense of relief." (citation omitted)).
305. For example, the Maine legislature has adopted a statute that allows
the minor to choose counseling as an option in lieu of parental consent or ajudicial hearing. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597-A (Supp. 1990). The Con-
necticut legislature has adopted a statute mandating counseling prior to per-
forming an abortion on a minor, but the Connecticut statute does not provide
for parental consent or a judicial hearing. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-601
(West. Supp. 1991).
306. See L. TRIBE, supra note 89, at 211 ("The most obvious thing all of this
suggests about how we might best find our way around the conflict between the
woman's liberty and the fetus's life is that we must reduce the number of situa-
tions in which women are pregnant but do not want to be."); see also NRC RE-
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